Thinking Through Categories

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First Draft: December 2000
This Draft: April 2002

Abstract

I present a model of human inference in which people use coarse categories to make inferences. Coarseness means that rather than updating continuously as suggested by the Bayesian ideal, people update change categories only when they see enough data to suggest that an alternative category better fits the data. This simple model of inference generates a set of predictions about behavior. I apply this framework to produce a simple model of financial markets, where it produces straightforward and testable predictions about returns predictability, comovement and volume.

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1 Introduction

Consider the following fictional problem:

As a student, Linda majored in philosophy. She was active in social causes, being deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and the environment. Though this has waned, at one point she frequently meditated and practiced yoga. Suppose you had to predict “What do you think Linda does for a living? Does she work as an investment banker or as a social worker?”

How would most people arrive at this guess?\(^1\) The description of Linda allows us to categorize her, to pinpoint her as a particular type of person. At the cost of reducing the complexity of this type, let us refer to this category as “hippie”.\(^2\) This category implicitly provides us with a rich description of her traits. This description allows us to make many predictions about Linda that are not mentioned in the initial description. Contrast this to how a Bayesian would proceed. A Bayesian would combine the description with base rates to form a probability distribution over all possible “types” Linda could be. The probability of each outcome (social worker and investment banker) would be assessed for each type. These probabilities would then be multiplied by the probability of each type and added together to assess the probability that Linda is a social worker.

This contrast highlights two features of coarseness in the model I put forward in this paper. First, the type hippie maybe a amalgam of several different types of people. In other words, this category compresses together various other types into one large category. Second, once Linda is thought to be a hippie other categories are not considered in making predictions.

\(^1\)I want to use this example only to sketch an intuition about how cognition works. I do not mean to imply that the “social worker” answer is in any way inconsistent with Bayesian thinking or that it represents a bias.

\(^2\)To appreciate the oversimplification of this naming, note that a big fraction of people one might classify into this type, would not be thought of as a hippie. In the rest of the paper I will, purely for the sake of exposition, be forced to give my categories oversimplified names.
I formalize these two features into one simple assumption about what I call categorical thinking. In this model, individuals make predictions in an uncertain environment. The outcomes are stochastic and generated by one of many true underlying types. This general setup encompasses many possible applications. In financial markets, investors must predict future earnings which is determined by the firm’s type or earnings potential. In labor markets, employers must make predictions about future productivity of a worker where workers differ in their underlying ability. Bayesians in this context would continuously update their posterior distribution over the underlying types and make predictions by using this full distribution. Categorical thinkers, on the other hand, hold coarser beliefs. The set of categories forms a partition of the posterior space and they choose one category given the data. They make this choice in an optimal way, that is the they choose the category which is most likely given the data. Having chosen the category, they make forecasts by using the probability distribution associated with the category. Categorical thinking is, therefore, a simplification of Bayesian thinking in which people can only hold a finite set of posteriors rather than every possible posteriors.

This simplification produces a parsimonious model of human inference. This model has several noteworthy features. First, as the number of categories increases the individual comes to better and better approximate Bayesian reasoning. In the limit, the categorical thinker will be identical to a Bayesian one. Second, under certain conditions, individuals under-react to news: they will not revise their predictions sufficiently in response to news. If the news is small enough, the category will not change and therefore the prediction will not change at all. Third, under different conditions, individuals over-react to news. This occurs when individuals revise and change categories. Because they now switch drastically between two very different hypothesis, they will be over-react. Finally, individuals can make faulty predictions even when they are completely certain of the underlying type. Because categories can collapse different types into the same category, the categorical thinker cannot sufficiently

\[\text{In Mullainathan (1999), I present a model that includes another feature of categorical thinking, representativeness. I discuss this in greater detail in Section 3.7.}\]

\[\text{Interestingly, classical statistics resembles categorical thinking. The presumption that there is a null hypothesis which is held until sufficient data warrants rejecting it is akin to having coarse categories.}\]
distinguish between types. These results follow directly from the logic of coarseness and they nest a set of different biases into one simple model.

I apply this model to two issues in finance. The first application examines what categorical thinking implies for stock price responses to earnings news. In the stylized model, firms differ in their underlying propensity to generate high earnings. Individuals use past earnings to make inferences about future earnings and, hence, firm value. These assessments of firm value translate into individual demand for the stock, which when aggregated produce prices and returns for the firm. In this simple setup, I show that categorical thinking leads to several predictions. First, a single earnings announcement will lead to under-reaction. That is, after a positive (negative) earnings announcement, a strategy of buying the stock will yield abnormal positive (negative) returns. Second, several announcements consistently in one direction will lead to an over-reaction. So for example, after a sequence of positive (negative) announcements, a strategy of buying the stock will yield abnormal negative (positive) returns. Third, as the sequence of consistent information gets longer, volume initially increases and then diminishes. The first two predictions match the existing empirical work on stock price response to earnings announcements. The third prediction, however, has not been tested and provides a straightforward test of the model.

The second model examines what categorical thinking implies when firms are classified into natural categories, such as industries or size. Again, individuals must aggregate information to form assessments of a firm’s health. But this time I assume this information is not about the firm itself but about some broader set of firms. For example, the information may be about industries or about firms of a particular size. This model produces a set of predictions about anomalous movements in price. The core idea behind these is that firms will comove too closely with the groups they are categorized with and not enough with the groups they are not categorized in. These can be seen most clearly in the case where the groups are industries and firms are a mix of pure-play firms and diversified ones. First, diversified firms will over-respond to news in the industries they are categorized in and under-respond to news in the industries they are not categorized in. Second, firms can be mis-valued if the
industry they are classified in has a price-to-earnings ratio that is very different from the industries they are in. When this effect is large, it can lead to so-called negative stubs, such as the Palm and 3-Com example, in which a firm appears to trade for lower value than the stock it holds. The latter prediction, therefore, provides one interpretation of the empirical work on negative stubs and tracking stocks. The first prediction, however, has not been tested.

The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 sketches a simple example which highlights the important intuitions of the model. Section 3 lays out the general model of categorical thinking. Section 4 presents the earnings reaction application to finance. Section 5 presents the application to natural categories in finance, such as industry. Section 6 concludes.

2 Simple Example

A simple example will illustrate how categorical thinking operates. Suppose a boss is interested in evaluating an employee who engages in a project each period. The outcome of the project is stochastic and is either good (1) or bad (0). The quality of the employee determines the odds that each period’s project turns out good or bad. The employee’s type $t$ is either good $G$, okay $O$ or bad $B$. A good employee produces a good outcome with probability $g > \frac{1}{2}$, a bad employee produces it with probability $b = 1 - g < \frac{1}{2}$ and an okay employee produces it with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \). Let’s assume that the boss has priors which are symmetric but put more weight on the employee being okay, so $p(O) > p(G) = P(B)$.

Each period the boss observes the project outcome and must forecast the next period’s outcome. Let $d$ be the data observed so far. For example, $d$ might equal 0011 indicating the agent had 2 failures and then had 2 successes. Let $e$ be the event being forecasted, for example whether the next project will turn out good or bad. The task facing the boss is to predict $e$ given $d$. A Bayesian with knowledge of the model would form beliefs as:

$$p(e|d) = p(e|G)p(G|d) + p(e|O)p(O|d) + p(e|B)p(B|d)$$
It’s easy to see that there will exist functions $x(d)$ and $y(d)$ so that:

$$p(1|d) = g \cdot x(d) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 - x(d) - y(d)) + (1 - g) \cdot (y(d))$$

Here $x(d)$ is increasing in the number of 1s in the past and $y(d)$ is increasing in the number of 0s. This is quite intuitive. The Bayesian merely sees how many goods there have been and updates his or her probabilities over all possible types. To make forecasts, he assesses probability of a 1 for each type, multiplies by the updated probabilities and then adds them all together. If the Bayesian model were to be taken literally, it would suggest that the boss is keeping track of all possibilities and incorporating them all in making forecasts.

Consider the following alternative. Suppose instead of keeping track of all possibilities, the boss imply makes his best guess as to whether the employee is good, bad or okay and then uses this best guess to make predictions. For example, if the past performance history is roughly balanced between 1 and 0s, the employer decides that the employee is an okay one and forecasts probability $\frac{1}{2}$ of outcome 1 on the next project.

Experimental evidence in psychology supports this idea that individuals focus on one category, at the exclusion of others. Murphy and Ross (1994) present a simple experiment which illustrate this point. Subjects viewed large sets of drawings from several categories (“those drawn by Ed”, “those drawn by John”...), where each category had its own features. The participants were then asked to consider a new stimulus (e.g. a triangle) and asked which category it fit best. They were then asked the probability it would have a specified property, such as a particular color. They found that participants’ assessment of this probability depended on the frequency with which this property appeared in the chosen category. But it did not depend on it’s frequency in alternative categories. Other evidence is provided in Malt, Ross and Murphy (1995). In one experiment, subjects were given the following story:

Andrea Halpert was visiting her good friend, Barbara Babs, whom she had not seen in several years. The house was lovely, nestled in a wooded area outside of the small Pennsylvanian town. Barbara greeted her at the door and shoed her into the spacious living room. They talked for a while and then Barbara went to
make some tea. As Andrea was looking around, she saw a black-furred animal run behind a chair. [She hadn't realized that Barbara had a dog as a pet]/[She hadn't realized that Barbara had a pet, but thought it was probably a dog.] Barbara came back and they caught up on old times. Did Barbara know what happened to Frank? Had Andrea been back to some of their old haunts?

In the high-certainty condition, subjects are given the first sentence in italics, whereas in the low-certainty condition they are given the second sentence in italics. Following this story, subject were given a set of questions, one of which was “What is the probability that the black-furred animal chews slippers?” They find that individuals report the same probability irrespective of the condition. An independent test showed that subjects in fact believed the manipulation: they assessed the probability that the animal was dog as lower in the low-certainty condition. But this did not influence their prediction: they predicted as if the animal were basically a dog.

A final experiment is provided by Krueger and Clement (1994). They ask subjects to guess the average high and low temperatures between 1981 and 1990 in Providence, Rhode Island. Each subject was given a sequence of randomly generated month and day pair, e.g. July 20, and asked to guess a temperature. They find that subjects are fairly accurate at their guesses on average. The average forecast error across all months is zero, suggesting no particular bias towards guessing too warm or too cold. But they find the following interesting pattern. A noticeable jump in temperature occurred when the month changed. That is, for two equally spaced days, the difference in predicted temperature was greater when the days straddled a month than when they were in the same one. One intuitive interpretation is that subjects used the month as the category, focusing on that to make their predictions. During warming periods (e.g. Spring), they under-forecasted the temperatures of days later in the month and over-forecasted temperatures of early days. Instead of viewing April 29 as partly an April day and mostly a May day, they erred by forecasting a temperature for it that was too close to the April mean. As the authors note:

Willard Scott, the noted weatherman of NBC’s “Today” program exclaimed on
January 27, 1994, “Geez, come on, February”.

These experiments make it clear that a good operating assumption for now will be that individuals use the most likely category.

Returning to the example, let \( c^*(d) \) be the chosen category \( G, O \) or \( B \). This choice will be governed by the posteriors: the most likely category will be chosen. In other words, if the Bayesian were forced to choose one category, he would choose \( c^*(d) \). Formally:

\[
c^*(d) = \begin{cases} 
G & \text{if } \max \{ x(d), y(d), 1-x(d) - y(d) \} \\
O & \text{if } \max \{ x(d), y(d), 1-x(d) - y(d) \} \\
B & \text{if } \max \{ x(d), y(d), 1-x(d) - y(d) \}
\end{cases}
\]  

(1)

Note that this formalism presumes correct choice of category, with people using the true probability distribution over categories. For example, they do not mistakenly ignore base rates in choosing the categories.\(^6\)

Intuitively, when there are a lot of good outcomes, \( G \) will be chosen, when there are a lot of bad outcomes \( B \) will be chosen and when good and bad outcomes are roughly balanced, \( O \) will be chosen. Predictions are now extremely simple. Let \( k(e|d) \) be the prediction of a categorical thinker:

\[
k(e|d) = \begin{cases} 
g & \text{if } c^*(d) = G \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } c^*(d) = O \\
b & \text{if } c^*(e)c^*(d) = B
\end{cases}
\]

What kind of bias does this simple decision rule generate? First, let us focus on the case where \( c^*(d) = O \). This means that the data is roughly balanced with around the same number of good and bad projects. The categorical forecast here will be \( \frac{1}{2} \) of a good outcome. Differencing this from the Bayesian suggests that the bias is:

\[
k(e|d) - p(e|d) = \left( \frac{1}{2} - g \right) x(d) + \left( \frac{1}{2} - b \right) y(d)
\]

---

5 In this simple example, categories and types will be equivalent.

6 Base rate ignorance would amount to ignoring the base line probability of a category \( p(c) \) in choosing categories. Kruschke (1996) surveys the evidence on whether base rates are in fact used in choosing categories and argue that the evidence is remarkably mixed.
So the categorical thinker is ignoring the fact that the employee might be good or bad and both of these produce biases. If there are more than half good projects then this bias will be negative. The categorical thinker will be under-forecasting how good the next project will be. The reason is straightforward. Because there are more good than bad outcomes, the Bayesian thinker would have moved his beliefs that the employee is good and increased his forecasted probability of a good outcome next year. Since the categorical thinker does not move his beliefs, he will be under-forecasting. The reverse is true if there are slightly more bad projects than good ones in the past. The categorical thinker will now over-forecast the probability of a good outcome now because she is not updating towards the employee being bad. Put these two together and we see that in this range, the categorical thinker is under reacting to news.

Now consider the case where the chosen category would be good, \( c^*(d) = G \). In this case, the categorical thinker will over-forecast the probability of a good outcome:

\[
k(e|d) - p(e|d) = (g - \frac{1}{2})(1 + y - x + y) > 0
\]

Once there have been enough good projects, the employer changes his mind and decides that the employee must be a good one. But of course, there is still some probability that the employee is only okay or bad. By ignoring this information, the switch generates an over-reaction.\(^7\) That is, the employee over-responds to the news which precipitates the change in category.

Another interesting feature worth noting in this example is how the bias evolves. Consider once again the case where the chosen category is okay: \( c^*(d) = O \). Recall that the bias in this case was \((\frac{1}{2} - g)x(d) + (\frac{1}{2} - b)y(d)\). When the performance history is roughly even, then \( x(d) \approx y(d) \) and the bias is zero. This is sensible: in this case a Bayesian would have symmetric priors and would also forecast probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the next project being good. But notice what happens as the history becomes more imbalanced, say as the number of projects becomes disproportionately good. The bias now becomes more and more negative. When this history becomes too disproportionate, the category switches an the bias now becomes

\(^7\)Note that because there is there is still under-reaction to news once in this category.
positive. In other words, the move from under-reaction to over-reaction is not monotonic. The under-reaction becomes more and more severe until it translates into over-reaction at the point of category switch.

This example illustrates several features of categorical thinking. First, the tendency to change opinions infrequently can lead to under-reaction. Second, this bias can increase as the weight of information that has been under-responded to increases. Finally, when beliefs are changed they will lead to an over-reaction.

3 General Model

How do we go about generalizing this example? In this simple example, categorization involves choosing one of the possible types and presuming that it the correct one. This choice can be put in broader terms. The set of beliefs the Bayesian can have after seeing some data forms a simplex: \((p(G), p(O), P(B))\). And he updates by choosing a belief in this simplex. The categorical thinker, however, can only hold one of three beliefs in that simplex: \((1,0,0)\), \((0,1,0)\) and \((0,0,1)\). This motivates how this example is generalized into a model of coarseness: a categorical thinker is forced to choose from a limited set of beliefs rather than from the full, continuous space available to the Bayesian.

3.1 Setup

I am going to model categorization in an abstract inference set-up, one which admits many different applications. In this setup, an individual is attempting to forecast the outcome of a statistical process on the basis of limited data. Define \(D\) to be the set of data that the individual may observe prior to making forecasts and \(E\) to be the set of events or outcomes that the individual will be making forecasts about.\(^8\) Let \(T\) be the set of underlying types. Each type determines the process which generates the outcomes. Define \(p(o|d, t)\) to be the

\(^8\)Of course, these sets will not necessarily be exclusive. In the example above, data was information about project success, while events to be forecasted were also information about project success.
true conditional probability distribution which generates the data if the true type were \( t \).

I will assume that the prior probability of any one type is defined by \( p(t) \) and that \( p(d|t) \)
define the conditional probability of observing some data.

The bench-mark for inference will be the Bayesian who has full knowledge of the structure of the underlying stochastic process. This Bayesian would make the forecast:

\[
p(o|d) = \int_{t \in T} p(o|d, t)p(t|d)
\]

As noted earlier, cognitively, this would amount to updating the probability of every state
given the data \( d \), the probability of \( e \) for each type and then summing over all types.

Define \( Q \) to be the full set of distributions over types. Each \( q \in Q \) defines a probability for each type. In equation 2 the Bayesian chooses one distribution from this set \( Q \) and makes forecasts using this distribution. In other words, nothing constrains the Bayesian from choosing the distribution of his choice and he therefore chooses the optimal posterior.

### 3.2 Categories

Coarseness of categories will be modelled as a constraining what distribution can be chosen from the full set \( Q \). So a category in this context will correspond to a specific distribution over types. Let \( C \) be the set of categories and \( c \) define a specific category. Each category has associated with it a particular point in the posterior space. This point represents the category, call it \( q_c(t) \). In the simple example before, we were presuming that \( C \) contained three elements whose associated distributions were \((1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)\). The second feature of categories is that they must partition the posterior space. In other words, while the Bayesian chooses any given point, the categorical thinker will end up choosing one of the categories. The map which dictates what category gets chosen for each possible posterior in \( Q \). In the example above, the partition was implicitly given by equation 1. For example, the posterior \((1, 0, 0)\) may be assigned to the O category. Let \( c(q) \) be the function which assigns each point in the posterior space to a category. I will assume this function is continuous in the sense that the implied partition is continuous. It will also be useful to define \( p(c) \)
to be the probability $\int_t p(t)q_c(t)$, in other words the base-rate of a category will be the probability of the underlying distribution. Similarly, define $q(o|d) = \int_t q(t)p(o|d)$ to be the conditional probability distribution over outcomes for any given $q$ and $p(d|c)$ to be the analogous distribution over data. So the set of categories is defined by two things: $c(q)$ which maps every posterior to a category and $q_c(t)$ which dictates what specific posterior the category is represented by.

But we do not want to allow for any arbitrary partition. Specifically, as in the example, the category which best fits the data should be chosen. Define $c^*(d)$ to be the category associated with the posterior that data $d$ leads to. Specifically, $c^*(d) \equiv c(p(t|d))$. Every categorization must satisfy the condition that the category associated with some data is the one that is most likely to generate that data:

$$c^*(d) \in \text{argmax}_c p(d|c)p(c)$$

So the chosen category must be amongst the ones that the Bayesian would choose if forced to choose one category.\(^9\) As before, the base-rate of each category is taken into account in choosing that category. And as before the choice of category is optimal: it is what the Bayesian would choose if forced to choose one category.

Having chosen a category, the categorical thinker uses it to make predictions. Specifically if we define $k(o|d)$ to be the forecasts of a categorical thinker then:

$$k(o|d) \equiv q_{c^*(d)}(o|d) = \int_t p(o|t,d)q_{c^*(d)}(t)$$

In other words, he uses the probability distribution associated with the category to make predictions.\(^10\)

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\(^9\)This equation may not be binding in many cases as we will see below.

\(^{10}\)This definition makes clear that while categories define a partition of the posterior set, they are more. Different categorizations that produce identical partitions will not necessarily result in the same predictions. In the example above, the categories were $(1,0,0),(0,1,0)$ and $(0,0,1)$ or the vertices of the simplex. Suppose they had been $(1-\epsilon_1,0,0),(0,1-\epsilon_2,0),(0,0,1-\epsilon_3)$, points close to the vertices but not the vertices themselves. For some $\epsilon_j$ this will produce an identical partition of the simplex. But the forecasts as defined above using these categories will not be the same since the distribution used to make predictions will be different. So even though the choice of category will look the same, what is done once the category is chosen will be different.
One point about this generalization is worth noting. Whereas in the example, we presumed that the individual merely chose one type, he can now choose a distribution over types. In the example, this would be analoguous to allowing the boss to hold more moderated views, such as the worker is “pretty good”, which might correspond to a category which places weight $\frac{1}{2}$ on $G$ and weight $\frac{1}{2}$ on $B$. Thus this formalism allows us to generalize the example above where the categorical thinker can only hold extreme opinions such as “for sure good”. We can now model the categorical thinker as fine-tuning the beliefs somewhat though not necessarily perfectly, allowing opinions such as “pretty sure good”.

### 3.3 Categories as Approximations

How well does the categorical thinker approximate the Bayesian thinker? Loosely speaking, the answer depends on the number of categories. But it is not a given that increasing the number of categories will result in infinitesimal approximations of the Bayesian thinker. To see this, suppose that in the example above, we produced categories of the form $(1 - \frac{k}{n}, \frac{k}{n}, 0)$ and $(0, 0, 1)$ for $k \leq n$. As $n$ gets larger and larger the number of categories would be increasing towards infinity. But though each successive categorization is getting better and better at distinguishing between good and okay employees, it is getting no better at distinguishing between bad employees and good or okay ones. Thus, while the number of categories is growing, the categorical prediction in this case will not approach the Bayesian one.

To formalize a sufficient condition for categories to eventually approximate the Bayesian ideal, suppose $C_n$ is a sequence of categorizations. I will say this sequence densely covers the posterior space if:

$$\forall q \in Q, \epsilon > 0) (\exists i)(\forall j \geq i)(\exists c \in C_j) max_t(q(t) - q_c(t)) < \epsilon$$

Intuitively, a sequence of categorizations densely covers the posteriors space if eventually every posterior is arbitrarily close to some category. In the canonical example above, consider the sequence of categorizations wherein categorization number $n$ contains all the categories where each element in the posterior is of the form $(\frac{1}{2^m}, \frac{1}{2^j}, \frac{1}{2^i})$ where $i, j, m$ are all less than
or equal to $n$. Thus, categorization number 0 would be the one used in the example: the vertices of the simplex. Categorization number 1 would have the vertices but would also include categories of the form $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0)$ and permutations of these and so on. As $n$ increases, these categories would eventually come to cover the simplex. This definition readily produces the following result.

**Proposition 1** Let $C_n$ be a sequence of categorizations that densely covers the posterior space. If $k_n(o|d)$ is the prediction associated with categorization $C_n$, then:

$$(\forall o, \epsilon > 0)(\exists i)(\forall j \geq i)|k_n(o|d) - p(o|d)| < \epsilon$$

In other words, the categorical thinker gets arbitrarily close to the Bayesian.

**Proof:** The proof is straightforward. By definition, one can always choose an $n$ large enough so that the $q_{c_n}(d)$ is arbitrarily close to $p(t|d)$, the correct posterior.

This in turn means that the predicted probabilities will be arbitrarily close.

### 3.4 Biases in Categorical Thinking

This proposition shows that when categories are fine enough, the categorical thinker will approximate the Bayesian one. But what happens when categories are coarse? Three kinds of bias arise. First as was seen in the coin example, because categorical thinkers change their beliefs rarely, they are often under-reacting to information. Second, also seen in the coin example, when changes in categories do occur, they are discrete resulting in an over-reaction. Finally, and this was not present in the coin example, categories collapse types: this can lead to biases even when there is no updating of types, simply because the same prediction function is used for several distinct types.

Formally, let $d$ be some data and $n$ be some news. We are interested in how beliefs are revised in the face of news, so in how $k(o|d)$ is revised into $k(o|d\&n)$. Comparing this revision to the Bayesian benchmark of $p(o|d) - p(o|d\&n)$ tells whether the categorical thinker responded appropriately or not and a way of quantifying bias. In this context, it will be
useful to define news as being informative about outcome $o$ whenever $p(o|d) - p(o|d\&n) \neq 0$, in other words when the news should cause a change in beliefs.

3.4.1 Under-Reaction

Consider the case where the news $n$ does not lead to a change in category. When there is no change in category:

$$k(o|d) - k(o|d\&n) = q_{e(d)}(o|d) - q_{e(d)}(o|d\&n)$$

But the two terms in the right hand side need not equal each other. Therefore, unlike in the example, in this more general setup predicted probabilities can change even though the category does not change. This in turn may make it so that even when there is no change in category, there may not be under-reaction.

A simple example illustrates. Suppose we are forecasting flips of a coin and there are two processes governing the coin. One process is positively auto-correlated and has equal chances of generating heads and tails on the first flip. The other process generates much more tails than heads on the first flip but is slightly mean-reverting in that the bias towards tails is lowered in the second flip (though there is still a bias towards heads). Suppose that the auto-correlated one is thought to be slightly more likely ex ante. In the absence of any data, the categorical thinker would predict probability $\frac{1}{2}$. After seeing a tail, what does she do? If she has not switched category, the time when we expect under-reaction she'll actually predict a higher chance of tails because of the positive auto-correlation. The Bayesian, however, because she considers the other category will still update towards tails on the second flip, but less so because the alternative category is being considered and in this alternative, the bias towards tails decreases.

Certain assumptions, however, guarantee that there will be under-reaction to news that does not change categories. Define the types to be a sufficient statistic if:

$$(\forall o, t, d)p(o|d, t) = p(o|t)$$
In other words, if the type completely summarizes the data then types are a sufficient statistic. Also, define the size of news \( n \) for outcome \( o \) given data \( d \) to be \( |p(o|d\&n) - p(o|d)| \).

These definitions readily provides the following result:

**Proposition 2** Suppose types are a sufficient statistic and that a particular news is informative about an outcome \( o \) given data \( d \). Categorical thinkers will under-respond to this news if it does not lead to a category change. Formally, if \( c^*(d) = c^*(d\&n) \), then

\[
|k(o|d) - k(o|d\&n)| < |p(o|d) - p(o|d\&n)|
\]

Moreover, as the size of the news increases, the extent of under-reaction increases.

**Proof:** Note that \( |p(o|d) - p(o|d\&n)| \) is positive because the news is assumed to be informative. But

\[
|k(o|d) - k(o|d\&n)| =
\]

\[
= q_{k^*(d)}(o|d) - q_{k^*(d)}(o|d\&n)
\]

\[
= q_{k^*(d)}(o) - q_{k^*(d)}(o) = 0
\]

because types are a sufficient statistic.

The size effect follows mechanically now because \( |p(o|d) - p(o|d\&n)| \) is increasing while \( k(o|d) - k(o|d\&n) = 0 \).

The intuition behind this proof is quite simple. Because types are a sufficient statistic, predicted probabilities only change when types or categories change. Therefore, predicted probabilities do not change in response to news that does not change categories. But because the news is informative, we know they should and the lack of a change generates under-reaction.

### 3.5 Over-Reaction

What happens when categories change? In the above example, we saw that category change leads to a clear-cut over-reaction. As with under-reaction, to recover the result in this general
context, we will have to assume that types are sufficient statistic. To formalize this notion, we will need a few definitions first. For two categories $c_1$ and $c_2$ and data $d$, an outcome is distinguished if $q_{c_1}(o|d) \neq q_{c_2}(o|d)$. In other words, an outcome is distinguishable if the two categories lead to different predictions on it.

**Proposition 3** Suppose data $d$ has been observed and then news $n$ is observed and types are a sufficient statistic. If (1) news $n$ leads to a change in categories and (2) $o$ is distinguishable for categories $c^*(d)$ and $c^*(d\&n)$, then if the size of the news $n$ is sufficiently small, the categorical thinker will over-react to it. Specifically:

$$|k(o|d) - k(o|d\&n)| < |p(o|d) - p(o|d\&n)|$$

**Proof:** We know the left hand side is strictly positive because the news is distinguishable and types are a sufficient statistic. As the news gets small, however, the right hand side tends towards zero.

The intuition behind this result is extremely simple. Since changes in categories are discrete, small amounts of information can trigger it. Thus, even though Bayesian decision making would dictate only a small change in predicted probabilities, the categorical thinker will show a large, discrete change in expectations, thus precipitating an over-reaction.

### 3.6 Misinterpretation

A final source of bias in this model comes purely from the fact that data can be misinterpreted because a coarse category, rather than the correct type is used. To make this type of problem, let us focus on situations where there is full information about the underlying type. Define data $d$ to generate a unique type if there exists some type $t$ such that $p(t|d) = 1$. In many contexts, prediction is not about inferring type but instead about translating past data into future predictions. In the example from Section 5, investors have data on what firm an industry is in (this is the type) and must use the type to translate information about how industries are doing into a prediction for the specific firm at hand. But because categorical
thinkers may not have categories for each particular type, they may end up mistaking this translation.

Suppose data $d$ generates a unique type $t$ and the individual faces some news $n$. The Bayesian would forecast $p(o|t, n)$. The categorical thinker on the other hand forecasts:

$$k(o|d, n) = q_{c^*|d,n}(o|n)$$

$$= q_{c^*|d,n}(t)p(o|t, n) + \int_{s \neq t} p(o|n, s)q_{c^*|d,n}(s)$$

This will equal the Bayesian forecast $p(o|t, n)$ if $q_{c^*|d,n}(t) = 1$. In other words, if the category chosen for $d, n$ is in fact the type distinguished by the data itself. If not, there is room for misinterpretation. In other words, whenever the categories lump together the posterior which places full weight on type $t$ with other distinct posteriors, then news will be construed to mean something other than it is.

### 3.7 Representativeness

This section makes clear that the simple assumption of coarseness leads to straightforward results and generates some systematic biases. As highlighted in Mullainathan (1999), a second feature of categorization when combined with coarseness yields yet more predictions. In fact, together these two features produce behavior that are quite close the psychology evidence on decision making.

Labeled *representativeness*, the second feature of categorical thinking is that a category is not just defined by a point in the posterior space. Instead each category has associated with it a representativeness function. I make two assumptions about this function. First, I assume that representativeness is proportional to the true probability distribution for that category. Events that are more likely, in a probability sense, are also more representative. Second, I assume that an outcome is more representative when that outcome is more likely to generate that category. For example suppose outcome $e_1$ and $e_2$ have the same probability under category $c$. If $c^*(e_1) = c$, but $c^*(e_2) \neq c$, then $e_1$ is considered more representative.
More generally, I will assume that outcomes which are further from being in the category are considered to be less representative.

As before, people choose the category optimally. They merely use the representativeness function instead of the probability function to predict outcomes. To make predictions by asking how representative a particular outcome would be of the chosen category.

The effect of representativeness is easily understood by returning to our stylized example. Categorization is as before: a large fraction of good outcomes will lead the supervisor to decide the employee is good, a large fraction bad will lead the supervisor to decide he is bad, and a roughly balanced one will lead the supervisor to decide is okay. But the representativeness function is more complicated than the probability function used before. For example, in the absence of representativeness, classifying the employee as Ok would lead the boss to predict probability $\frac{1}{2}$ of success in the future. But this need not be the case now. To take a specific case, suppose that 2 good outcomes in a row would lead to classification of good whereas a 3rd good outcome would cause the boss to change his mind and call the employee good.

Suppose the boss has seen 2 successful projects; she individual will choose the okay category. Since three successful projects would not elicit a categorization of ok, it is by definition less representative. Hence after 2 successful projects, the employer would show a bias towards predict a bad project. This generates a second reason for under-reaction. Not only is the employer not incorporating the news in 2 heads and updating, he is now predicting that a tail will happen simply to make the sequence more representative of the okay category. This result matches experimental findings on the Law of Small Numbers or the Gambler’s fallacy. People often demonstrate such a predilection for expecting mean reversion, for expecting sequences to “right” themselves out (2 heads in a row should be “corrected” by a tail).

But consider what will be predicted after three good outcomes are observed. Now the boss will classify the employee as good. But since three goods followed by a success may not be a part of the good category, the boss is now biased towards over-forecasting good.
Again, the over-reaction when crossing the category boundary is exaggerated. Instead of simply forecasting the mean probability of good outcomes for the good category, the boss is even further exaggerating the probability of a good outcome simply because a bad outcome would make the sequence more representative of a different category. This result matches the experimental findings on the Hot Hand. People perceive this coin as “hot” and over-estimate the odds that it will continue. Notice the contrast with the Law of Small Numbers. Whereas it predicts the bias towards expecting runs to end, the Hot Hand emphasizes the bias towards expecting runs to continue. Despite their apparent contradictions, both arise intuitively and in a structured way in the same model.

In fact, they appear with enough structure that we can make predictions about when one will dominate, as can be seen in this example. After a single good, the bias towards a bad project will be weak. As the run length builds up, the bias towards a bad outcome (towards expecting the run to end) increases. When the run length got long enough, however, the bias became towards expecting another good project (or the run to continue). This specific pattern in which we expect the two forces to operate provides an easy to test, out of sample prediction of the model.

Another interesting feature of adding representativeness is that forecasted probabilities need not be monotonic: an outcome which is a strict subset of another may be seen as more probable. In the above example, after two good outcomes, when the employee is still thought of as only okay, 1110 (or one more good but followed by a bad outcome) may be seen as more likely than 111 (just one more good). This is because, under some parameter values, 1110 would elicit the okay category and hence be more representative than 111 which may not. This non-monotonicity in turn matches experimental evidence on the conjunction event. People sometimes report the event “A and B” as being more likely than the event “A” by itself. Again, we will see the model’s specificity allows extremely precise predictions about when the conjunction effect should arise.

In short, the addition of representativeness allows the model to mimic a variety of experimental data on decision-making. This paper focuses on the coarseness case alone because
it provides a much more tractable model for economic applications, which I turn to now.

4 Investor Response to Earnings Announcements

In this section, I sketch an extremely simple model of how categorical thinkers might respond to earnings announcements. Undoubtedly, as with any model, the specific predictions will depend on the exact earnings process that is assumed. For simplicity, I will simply expand on the example in Section 2, just to illustrate the kinds of predictions that such a model might make.\footnote{Note, however, that the predictions will depend on the specific context. If earnings processes are autocorrelated, then the predictions here might well change. Categorical models only provide a framework with which to make predictions. The exact predictions, as with Bayesian models, will depend on what is assumed about the environment. In fact, one of the useful feature of the categorical thining framework is it’s ability to make predictions in any context once the categories are specified.} Consider a single firm who has earnings each period, $E_t$, which are paid out as dividends. These earnings can either be $+1$ or $0$ and are iid distributed. The firm has an underlying probability $p$ of generating good earnings ($+1$). I will assume that there are three types of firms: good, okay and bad, where good firms have probability $g$ of generating good earnings, bad firms have probability $b = 1 - g$ and okay forms have probability $\frac{1}{2}$. As before, the prior probability on the three types is symmetric with the okay type having greater probability than the other two. To guarantee continuous learning, however, I will assume that each period the firm has an iid probability $s$ of changing types. If it changes, it gets a fresh draw from the prior distribution.

There is a continuum of individuals indexed between 0 and 1, each of whom is a categorical thinker. To model heterogeneity, I will assume that each of these individuals holds a slightly different categorization. Individual 0 holds the categorization similar to the example in Section 2: the vertices $(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)$. Individual $j$, however holds the categorization $(1 - (1-j)\epsilon, j\epsilon, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, j\epsilon, 1 - (1-j)\epsilon)$. In other words, for the category $G$ and $B$, instead of using the vertices, he uses a point slightly more interior to the simplex. What this means is that as $j$ decreases, the individual needs fewer successes to switch from the okay category to the good category or fewer failures to switch from the okay to the bad
category.

Let $q_{jt}$ be the perceived probability by individual $j$ at time $t$ that the firm will generate good earnings. Specifically if $h_t$ is the history of earnings $q_{jt} = k_j(1|h_t)$ where $k_j(\cdot)$ is the categorical forecast of individual of individual $j$. Let $r$ be the interest rate applied to discounting future earnings. What will be the person’s perceived value of the firm? This period he received earnings $E_t$. Next period, he expects $q_{jt}s$ (because the firm may have changed type and $q_{jt}s^2$ for the period after. When discounted this looks like:

$$E_t + q_{jt} \left( \left( \frac{s}{1+r} \right) + \left( \frac{s}{1+r} \right)^2 + \cdots \right) = E_t + q_{jt}A$$

where I’ve defined $A$ to be the constant associated with that sum. Define $V_{jt}$ to be the perceived valuation at time $t$ by individual $j$. Let $V_t$ be the actual value of the firm in the market. Suppose demand curves are linear with constant $\rho$ so that each individual demands are proportional to demand $\rho*(V_{jt} - V_t)$. Market clearing implies that $V_t = f V_{jt} = E_t + f q_{jt}A$.

In other words, the market clearing value of the firm is merely the current period earnings plus the average belief about the firm’s underlying propensity to generate good earnings.

To understand misreactions, it will be useful to define portfolio returns. Let $R(h_t)$ be the net present value of the dividend return to buying a the stock at time $t$ if history $h_t$ has occurred minus the purchase price. So $R(\cdot)$ positive indicates that there are positive abnormal returns, whereas $R(\cdot)$ negative indicates that there are negative abnormal returns. With this in place, the results from Section 3 readily translate into a serious predictions about how firms earnings will respond as codified in the following proposition.

**Proposition 4** Suppose that the earnings history $h_t$ is roughly balanced. Then there will exist $n^*$ such that:

1. A sequence of $n < n^*$ positive earnings announcements results in $R(h_{t1\cdots1})$ yielding a positive return. A sequence of $n < n^*$ negative earnings announcements results in $R(h_{t0\cdots0})$ yielding a negative return. In other words, the market under-responds to less than $n$ good or bad earnings announcements.
2. A sequence of \( n > n^* \) positive earnings announcements results in \( R(h_{t11}\cdots1) \) yielding a negative return. A sequence of \( n > n^* \) negative earnings announcements results in \( R(h_{t00}\cdots0) \) yielding a positive return. In other words, the market over-responds to more than \( n \) good or bad earnings announcements.

This result follows directly from the propositions in Section 3 and 2. A few consistent earnings announcements will lead to under-response because there is no change in category, whereas several good ones will lead to a change in category and over-response. One interesting feature to note, however, is that the heterogeneity means that the under-response may not be non-linear in aggregate. In Section 2, we saw that the individual under-response builds up, becoming an increasing under-response before becoming an over-response. In the aggregate, however, because some people switch categories earlier, the net mis-response need not be non-monotonic. But what this means is that agents will be trading with each other.\(^{12}\)

Since the market price switches to over-response when exactly half the agents have switched categories, this also means that the mis-response is also highest when half have switched. This is formalized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5** Suppose that the earnings history \( h_t \) is roughly balanced. Let \( n^* \) be the \( n^* \) from the previous proposition. Then for a streak of good or bad earnings announcements, volume is increasing in \( n \) until \( n > n^* \) at which point it diminishes.

In other words, heterogeneity *endogenously* builds up as some agents have switched categories before others. Specifically, agents with lower \( j \) will switch earlier and as the streak continues, eventually all the agents will switch and the heterogeneity will disappear as will trading volume.

While this is a highly stylized example, it does illustrate exactly how the propositions in Section 3 on under- and over-reaction can translate directly into a financial market. It also illustrates how the sharp changes induced by categorical changes need not show up only in prices but can translate into dramatic trading volume.

\(^{12}\)I will presume that each period agents start off with a new endowment of stocks so that there is history dependent in trading.
5 Application 2: Natural Firm Categories

In a second example, we will consider firms that are in natural categories. For example, some firms are thought of as large, some are thought of as small. Perhaps the most natural category. Consider firms that are in one of two industries, with fraction \( t \) of their earnings in industry 0 and fraction \( 1 - t \) in industry 1. This \( t \) denotes the type of the firm and suppose it is *publicly observable* for each firm. In this sense, we will be considering the case of Section 3.6. Suppose each period, the firm pays a dividend \( E_s \) which is either +1 or 0 and does so with probability \( p_s \). This probability \( p_s \) depends on the probabilities of the industry the firm is in. Let \( a_s \) be the probability for firms in industry 0 doing well at time \( s \) and \( b_s \) be the probability for firms in industry 1 doing well at time \( s \). Assume that:

\[
p_s = ta_s + (1 - t)b_s
\]

At the end of period \( s \), the probabilities for both industries in the next period are shown, so \( a_{s+1} \) and \( b_{s+1} \) are made public. These are drawn from a uniform distribution. With this information and when given information on the type of the firm, the Bayesian at time \( s \) would value the firm at:

\[
E_s + \frac{r}{2(1 + r)} + \frac{ta_{s+1} + (1 - t)b_{s+1}}{1 + r}
\]

In other words, the value of the firm is the value of the current earnings plus the guess of earnings next period (which depends on type plus the discounted value of all other future earnings (which are type independent).

Now consider a categorical thinker who has categories \((1, 0)\) and \((0, 1)\) so that he can only think of firms which are fully in one industry. Suppose further that the partition is such that firms which are below some threshold \( t < J \) are classified to be in industry 0 and those above the threshold are classified to be industry 1. Then the categorical thinker would value the diversified firm at:

\[
E_s + \frac{r}{2(1 + r)} + \frac{as+1}{1 + r} \quad \text{if} \quad t < J
\]

\[
E_s + \frac{r}{2(1 + r)} + \frac{bs+1}{1 + r} \quad \text{if} \quad t \geq J
\]
Thus for firms with $0 < t < J$ will over-respond to news about industry 0 and under-respond to news about industry 1. Similarly for firms with $J \leq t < 1$ he will over-respond to news about industry 1 and under-respond to news about industry 0.

In other words, for diversified firms, the industries they are classified in will make a difference. They will over-respond to news about industries they are put in and under-respond to news about industries they are not classified in. More generally, they will comove too much with the industry they are thought to be in and too little with the other one.

This logic also can generate findings about stubs. Consider a firm which is .75 in industry 0 which is having terrible times and .25 in industry 1 which is doing extremely well. If it is classified as being in industry 0, it will have a much lower valuation. In fact if industry 0 is doing poorly enough, the firm will look like it has negative valuation of it’s holdings in industry 0 because the entire firms future earnings streams, including those in the good industry are being valued using the outlook of industry 0.

Thus this simple categorization model makes straightforward and novel predictions about where misvaluations ought to occur when thinking about diversified firms. Relabeling these industry categories to be other natural categories such as glamor and value or large and small will suggest a set of predictions about comovement of firms with their natural categories as well as when over and under-valuation will occur.

6 Conclusion

To summarize, the coarseness induced by categories provides an extremely simple framework for thinking about a wide variety of biases. As the financial applications make clear, the model is ultra-simple to apply and readily makes testable predictions.