The Timing and Returns of Mergers and Acquisitions in Oligopolistic Industries

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January 2008

Abstract

This article develops a real options model to study the interaction of industry structure and takeovers. In an asymmetric industry equilibrium, firms have an endogenous incentive to merge when restructuring decisions are motivated by operating and strategic benefits. The model predicts that (i) merger activities are more likely in more concentrated industries or in industries that are more exposed to industrywide shocks; (ii) returns to merger and rival firms arising from restructuring are higher in more concentrated industries; (iii) increased industry competition delays the timing of mergers; and (iv) in sufficiently concentrated industries, bidder competition induces a bid premium that declines with product market competition.

JEL Classification Numbers: G13, G14, G31, G34.

Keywords: anticompetitive effect; industry structure; real options; takeovers.

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*We are grateful to Carliss Baldwin, Philip Dybvig, Espen Eckbo, Armando Gomes, Ulrich Hege, Michael Lemmon, Preston McAfee, Paul Povel, Martin Ruckes, Marc Rysman, Merih Sevilir, and Alexei Zhdanov; and to seminar participants at the 2007 UBC summer finance conference, the 2007 EFA meetings in Ljubljana, Boston University, Columbia University, Fudan University, Jinan University, MIT Sloan, the University of Karlsruhe, the University of Maryland, the University of Minnesota, and Washington University in St. Louis for helpful comments. Patricia Richardson provided excellent editorial assistance.

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1 Introduction

Despite extensive study of mergers and acquisitions, some important issues in the takeover process remain unclear. Most models tend to focus on firm characteristics to explain why firms should merge or restructure, but they are less successful at uncovering the relation between industry structure and takeovers. One primary drawback of many dynamic models of mergers and acquisitions is that they abstract from product market competition. We aim instead to develop an industry equilibrium model that analyzes the effect of product market competition on: (i) the gains from mergers; (ii) the joint determination of the timing and terms of mergers; and (iii) the returns to both merging and rival firms.\(^1\) We also examine the interaction between bidder competition and industry competition.

There is ample evidence on the effect of industry characteristics on mergers and acquisitions. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Harford (2005), and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that mergers occur in waves driven by industrywide shocks, and are strongly clustered by industry within a wave. Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993) document that airline fares on routes affected by a merger increase significantly over those on routes not affected by a merger. Kim and Singal (1993) and Singal (1996) also identify a positive relation between airfares and industry concentration. Eckbo (1985) documents that acquirers and targets earn abnormal returns, while Singal (1996) finds that abnormal returns to rival firms are positively related to changes in industry concentration. This research in general supports the view that mergers not only affect industry equilibrium but also have substantial anticompetitive effects.\(^2\)

To analyze the role of industry characteristics in the takeover process more thoroughly, we build a dynamic industry equilibrium model of mergers and acquisitions in a real options framework in the spirit of Lambrecht (2004). Unlike Lambrecht (2004), however, we consider an asymmetric oligopolistic industry structure similar to that in Perry and Porter (1985). We study horizontal mergers with a single bidder or with multiple bidders, assuming no exogenously specified operating synergies, such as economies of scale. Instead, we specify a tangible asset that helps increase output for a given average cost. The merged entity operates the assets of the two merging partners, so it

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\(^1\) Weston et al. (1990) and Weston et al. (1998) provide detailed reviews of the literature on mergers and acquisitions. Research in industrial organization, such as Farrell and Shapiro (1990), studies the welfare implications of mergers, but not the issues of merger timing, merger terms, and merger returns.

is larger and its average and marginal costs are lower. In addition to a different cost structure for the merged firm, all firms face a different industry structure after a merger. We derive closed-form solutions to asymmetric industry equilibria in which the benefits from merging are determined endogenously by both cost reduction and changes in product market competition.

Perry and Porter’s (1985) static model analyzes incentives to merge for two small firms only. Our dynamic model instead allows us to derive a number of predictions that are in line with the empirical evidence. It also has novel testable implications regarding the returns to merging firms, the timing and terms of mergers, and the bid premium. First, we introduce exogenous shocks to industry demand and demonstrate that a merger occurs the first time the demand shock hits a trigger value from below. That is, mergers occur in a rising product market. We also show that mergers are more likely in industries that are more exposed to industrywide shocks.

Second, increased product market competition delays the timing of mergers. This result is contrary to some conclusions in recent real options research. Grenadier (2002), for instance, emphasizes that industry competition erodes the option value of waiting and thus accelerates option exercise. In his symmetric industry model, anticompetitive profits result from exogenously reducing the number of identical firms that compete in the industry. Firms are asymmetric in our model, however, and anticompetitive profits result from endogenous choices of two merging firms. These anticompetitive profits are higher in more concentrated industries, because mergers have a larger effect on price increases in these industries. Thus, firms in less competitive industries optimally exercise their option to merge earlier.

Third, we show that cumulative merger returns are determined by an anticompetitive effect, a size effect, and a hysteresis effect. In particular, cumulative merger returns are higher for the smaller merging firm than the larger merging firm when the firms have identical merger costs, because the smaller firm benefits more from a merger. To the extent that targets tend to be smaller than acquirers, this implication supports the available evidence. Moreover, the cumulative returns to merging and rival firms are positively associated with industry concentration. The intuition is simple: Returns under certain conditions are positively related to anticompetitive profit gains, which are positively related to industry concentration.

Finally, when a large firm bidder and a small firm bidder compete for a small firm target, and when merger costs are similar, the large firm bidder wins the takeover contest, which is consistent
with the stylized fact that targets are on average smaller than acquirers. Competition with the small firm bidder may speed up the takeover process and may lead the large firm bidder to pay a bid premium to discourage the competing small firm bidder. In a sufficiently concentrated industry, the bid premium increases with industry concentration. By contrast, in a sufficiently competitive industry, the small firm bidder may not matter, and the equilibrium outcome is the same as without bidder competition.

Our work contributes to a growing body of research using the real options approach to analyze the dynamics of mergers and acquisitions. Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) generalize Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) static model to incorporate imperfect information and uncertainty into a dynamic framework. Margirisi, Mello, and Ruckes (2006) analyze the decision to grow internally or externally by an acquisition, while Smith and Triantis (1995) argue that acquisitions may enable internal growth. Hackbarth and Morellec (2007) examine the risk dynamics throughout the merger episode. Lambrecht and Myers (2007) study takeovers in declining industries motivated by greater efficiency through layoffs, consolidation, and disinvestment. Leland (2007) considers purely financial synergies in motivating acquisitions when timing is exogenous, while Morellec and Zhdanov (2007) explore interactions between financial leverage and takeover activity with endogenous timing. All these papers do not consider the impact of product market competition on takeover activity.3

The research closest to ours is Bernile, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2006) and Lambrecht (2004). Bernile, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2006) build an industry model with two incumbents and a potential new entrant. They focus on merger waves, which are under certain conditions deterred by the threat of entry. Instead, we study a merger subject to product market competition with many heterogeneous firms. Lambrecht (2004) examines mergers motivated by economies of scale. Although he does not focus on industry structure, he does analyze a duopolistic industry and shows that market power strengthens symmetric firms’ incentives to merge. Unlike Lambrecht, we consider an oligopolistic Cournot–Nash equilibrium with asymmetric firms. To focus on the role of industry structure, we also abstract from economies of scale.

The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the timing and terms of a merger with a single bidder. Section 4 studies mergers with multiple bidders and analyze the interaction between bidder competition and product market competition.

3 Using the real options approach, Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997), Lambrecht (2001), and Miao (2005) develop industry equilibrium models to analyze the implications of industry structure for firm investment, financing, and entry and exit decisions.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.

2 Model

We incorporate an asymmetric oligopolistic industry structure into a real options framework. After outlining the framework’s assumptions, we characterize industry equilibrium when asymmetric firms play Cournot–Nash strategies. We then examine the incentive to merge when restructuring decisions are motivated by operating and strategic benefits. We also provide further discussion of some of the model’s assumptions.

2.1 Assumptions

Time is continuous, and uncertainty is modeled by a complete probability space \((\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{P})\). To construct a dynamic equilibrium model of firms’ restructuring decisions, we consider an industry populated by infinitely lived firms whose assets generate a continuous stream of cash flows. The industry consists of \(N\) heterogeneous firms that produce a single homogeneous product, where \(N \geq 2\) is an integer. Each firm \(i\) initially owns an amount \(k_i > 0\) of physical capital.

In order to focus on the dynamics of mergers and acquisitions and to keep the industry analysis tractable, we follow authors such as Lambrecht (2004) and Perry and Porter (1985) and assume that firms can grow only through a takeover, and that internal investment or new entry is not allowed. In addition, we assume that capital does not depreciate over time. The industry’s total capital stock is in fixed supply and equal to \(K\). Thus, the industry’s capital stock at each time \(t\) satisfies:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{N} k_i = K. \tag{1}
\]

The cost structure is important in the model. We denote by \(C(q, \kappa)\) the cost function of a firm that owns an amount \(\kappa\) of the capital stock and produces output \(q\). The output \(q\) is produced with a combination of the fixed capital input, \(\kappa\), and a vector of variable inputs, \(z\), according to a smooth concave production function, \(q = F(z, \kappa)\). Then the cost function \(C(q, \kappa)\) is obtained from the cost minimization problem. Unlike Lambrecht (2004), we assume that the production function \(F\) has constant returns to scale. This implies that \(C(q, \kappa)\) is linearly homogeneous in \((q, \kappa)\). For analytical tractability, we adopt the quadratic specification of the cost function, \(C(q, \kappa) = q^2/(2\kappa)\). This cost function may result from the Cobb-Douglas production function \(q = \sqrt{\kappa z}\), where \(z\) may represent
labor input. Note that both the average and marginal costs decline with the capital asset $\kappa$. Salant et al. (1983) show that if average cost is constant and independent of firm size, a merger may be unprofitable in a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand. It is profitable if and only if duopolists merge into monopoly. As Perry and Porter (1985) point out, the constant average cost assumption does not provide a sensible description of mergers.

The capital asset plays an important role in the model. It allows us to address the industry asymmetries caused by mergers of a subset of firms. A merged firm combines the capital assets of the two entities to produce output. It faces a different optimization problem immediately after restructuring because of its altered cost function and because of new strategic considerations that arise from the change in industry structure.

We suppose the industry’s inverse demand at time $t$ is given by the linear function:

$$P(t) = a Y(t) - b Q(t),$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $Y(t)$ denotes the industry’s demand shock at time $t$ observed by all firms, $Q(t)$ is the industry’s output at time $t$, and $a$ and $b$ are positive constants; $a$ represents exposure of demand to industrywide shocks, and $b$ represents the price sensitivity of demand. We assume that the demand shock is governed by the geometric Brownian motion process:

$$dY(t) = \mu Y(t) dt + \sigma Y(t) dW(t), \quad Y(0) = y_0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $\mu$ and $\sigma$ are constants and $(W_t)_{t\geq 0}$ is a standard Brownian motion defined on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$.

We assume that all firms are Cournot-Nash players and that management acts in the best interests of shareholders. We also assume that shareholders are risk-neutral and discount future cash flows by $r > 0$. Therefore, all corporate decisions are rational and value-maximizing choices. To ensure that the present value of profits is finite, we make the following assumption:

**Assumption 1** The parameters $\mu$, $\sigma$, and $r$ satisfy the condition $2(\mu + \sigma^2/2) < r$.

Two firms may decide to merge if it is in their best interest. Mergers are costly in reality. We assume that each firm $i$ incurs a fixed lump-sum cost $X_i > 0$ for $i = 1, \ldots, N$, if it engages in a merger. This cost captures fees to investment banks and lawyers as well as the cost of restructuring.
2.2 Industry equilibrium

Let $q_i(t)$ denote the quantity selected by firm $i$ at time $t$. Then firm $i$'s instantaneous profit is given by

$$\pi_i(t) = [a Y(t) - b Q(t)] q_i(t) - q_i(t)^2 /(2k_i),$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where

$$Q(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} q_i(t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

is the industry output at time $t$. Given the instantaneous profits, we can compute firm value, or the present value of profits:

$$V_i(y) = \mathbb{E}^y \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \pi_i(t) \, dt \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $\mathbb{E}^y[\cdot]$ denotes the conditional expectation operator, given that the current industry shock takes the value $Y(0) = y$.

We define strategies and industry equilibrium as follows. The strategy $\{(q_1^*(t), ..., q_N^*(t)) : t \geq 0\}$ constitutes an industry (Markov perfect Nash) equilibrium if, given information available at date $t$, $q_j^*(t)$ is optimal for firm $j = 1, ..., N$, when it takes other firms’ strategies $q_i^*(t)$ for all $i \neq j$ as given. Because firms play a dynamic game, there could be multiple Markov perfect Nash equilibria, as is well known in game theory. Instead of finding all equilibria, we will focus on the equilibrium in which firms adopt static Cournot strategies. As is well known, the static Cournot strategies that firms play at each date constitute a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. The first proposition characterizes this industry equilibrium. (Proofs for all propositions are given in the Appendix).

**Proposition 1** The strategy:

$$q_i^*(t) = \frac{\theta_i aY(t)}{1 + B} \frac{1}{b},$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

constitutes a Cournot–Nash industry equilibrium at time $t$ for firms $i = 1, ..., N$, where

$$\theta_i = \frac{b}{b + k_i^{-1}}, \quad \text{and} \quad B = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \theta_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

In this equilibrium, the industry output at time $t$ is given by

$$Q^*(t) = \frac{B aY(t)}{1 + B} \frac{1}{b},$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

and the industry price at time $t$ is given by

$$P^*(t) = \frac{aY(t)}{1 + B}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)
Note that this proposition also characterizes the equilibrium after a merger, once we change the number of firms and the capital stock of the merged firm. A merger brings the capital of two firms under a single authority and thus reduces production cost.

Without loss of generality, we consider that firms 1 and 2 merge. We use the subscript $M$ to denote the merged entity. The merged firm owns capital $k_M = k_1 + k_2$. By Proposition 1, the values of $\theta_i$ for the non-merging firms $i \geq 3$ are unaffected by the merger. We can verify that the value of $\theta$ for the merged firm satisfies:

$$\max \{ \theta_1, \theta_2 \} < \theta_M = \frac{\theta_1 + \theta_2 - 2\theta_1\theta_2}{1 - \theta_1\theta_2} < \theta_1 + \theta_2. \quad (11)$$

Thus, the value of $B$ in Proposition 1, which determines total industry output, changes after the merger to:

$$B_M = B + \theta_M - \theta_1 - \theta_2 < B. \quad (12)$$

By equations (9), (10), and (12), we conclude that the merger causes total output to fall and industry price to rise. In addition, we can use equations (12) and (7) to show that:

$$\max \{ q^*_1(t), q^*_2(t) \} < q_M(t) < q^*_1(t) + q^*_2(t), \quad (13)$$

where $q_M(t)$ is the output produced by the merged firm at time $t$. This result implies that the merged firm produces more than either of the two merging firms, but less than the total output level of the two. The analysis highlights the tension of a merger: After a merger, the industry price rises, but the merged firm restricts production. Thus, a merger may not generate a profit gain.

### 2.3 Incentive to merge

In order to analyze mergers tractably, we follow Perry and Porter (1985) and consider an oligopoly structure with small and large firms. Specifically, we assume that the industry initially consists of $n$ identical large firms and $m$ identical small firms. Each large firm owns an amount $k$ of capital and incurs merger costs $X_l$ if it engages in a merger. Each small firm owns an amount $k/2$ of capital and incurs merger costs $X_s$ if it engages in a merger. In this case, equation (1) becomes $nk + mk/2 = K$, and hence we can use $m = 2Kk^{-1} - 2n$ to replace $m$ in the analysis below.

We assume that either two small firms can merge (symmetric merger) or a small firm and a large firm can merge (asymmetric merger). In the former case, a merger preserves the two-type industry structure, but the number of small firms and large firms changes. In the latter case,
firm heterogeneity increases. That is, all non-merging small or large firms remain identical, but
the merged entity owns more physical capital than a large firm, destroying the two-type industry
structure.4

**Symmetric merger.** We first consider a symmetric merger. Define:

$$\Delta (n) \equiv (b + k^{-1}) (b + 2 (Kb + 1) k^{-1}) - b^2 n > 0.$$  \ (14)

Note that the argument $n$ in this equation indicates that there are $n$ large firms in the industry.
This notation is useful for our merger analysis below because the number of large firms changes
after a merger option is exercised. It follows from equation (1) that $Kk^{-1} > n$, which implies
that both $\Delta (n)$ and $\Delta (n + 1)$ are positive. We use Proposition 1 and equation (6) to compute
equilibrium firm value.

**Proposition 2** Consider a symmetric merger between two small firms in the small-large oligopoly
industry. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The equilibrium value of the type $f = s, l$ firm is given by:

$$V_f (y; n) = \frac{\Pi_f (n) y^2}{r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)},$$  \ (15)

where

$$\Pi_s (n) = \frac{a^2 (b + k^{-1})^3}{\Delta (n)^2},$$  \ (16)

$$\Pi_l (n) = \frac{a^2 (b + 2 k^{-1}) (b + k^{-1}/2)}{\Delta (n)^2}.$$  \ (17)

After a merger between two small firms, there are $n + 1$ identical large firms and $m - 2$ identical
small firms in the industry. Thus, the value of the large firm after a merger is given by $V_l (y; n + 1)$.
It follows from Proposition 2 that the benefit from merging is given by:

$$V_l (y; n + 1) - 2 V_s (y; n) = \frac{[\Pi_l (n + 1) - 2 \Pi_s (n)] y^2}{r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}.$$  \ (18)

The term $\Pi_l (n + 1) - 2 \Pi_s (n)$ represents the profitability of an anticompetitive merger. For there
to be takeover incentives, this term must be positive. After a merger, the number of small firms in
the industry is reduced, and hence the industry’s market structure is changed. As the output of two

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4We do not consider a merger between two large firms because this case does not add any significant new insight,
and is also more likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities. Solutions for this case are available upon request.
small firms prior to a merger exceeds the output of the merged firm, an incentive to merge requires that the increase in industry price be enough to offset the reduction in output of the merged entity. The conditions for takeover incentives may be summarized as follows:

**Proposition 3** Consider a symmetric merger between two small firms. Let \( \Delta(n) \) be given in (14) and define the critical value:

\[
\Delta^* = \frac{b^2}{1 - A},
\]

(19)

where \( A \) is given by:

\[
A \equiv (b + 2k^{-1}) \sqrt{\frac{b + k^{-1}/2}{2(b + k^{-1})^2}}.
\]

(20)

(i) If

\[
\max_n \Delta(n) = \Delta(0) < \Delta^*,
\]

(21)

then there will always be an incentive to merge. (ii) If

\[
\min_n \Delta(n) = \Delta(K/k - 1) > \Delta^*,
\]

(22)

then there will never be an incentive to merge. (iii) If

\[
\Delta(0) > \Delta^* > \Delta(K/k - 1),
\]

(23)

then when \( n \) is high enough so that \( \Delta(n) < \Delta^* \), there will be an incentive to merge.

In Proposition 3, (21) and (23) provide two conditions for takeover incentives in our Cournot–Nash framework. That is, when the increase in price outweighs the reduction in output so that the net effect leads to an increase in instantaneous profits, the two small firms have an incentive to form a large organization. These two conditions depend on the industry demand function through the price sensitivity \( b \), and the size of a large firm \( k \), and on the industry structure through the number \( n \) of large firms prior to the restructuring. Moreover, the proposition shows that there could be no incentives to merge if the condition in (22) holds.

It is straightforward to show that there is always an incentive to merge when the industry consists of a small-firm duopoly. A similar result is obtained by Perry and Porter (1985) and Salant et al. (1983) in a static industry model. Since then, Lambrecht (2004) has analyzed a dynamic model

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5 Similar conditions have been derived by Perry and Porter (1985) in their static model.
6 One can immediately verify that condition (21) is satisfied for \( k = K \), \( n = 0 \), and \( m = 2 \), which is a limiting case of our model.
in which duopolists merge to form a monopolist motivated by economies of scale, while Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) have assumed an exogenously specified synergy gain for a merger of two firms.

**Asymmetric merger.** After a merger between a large firm and a small firm, the industry consists of \( n - 1 \) identical large firms, \( m - 1 \) identical small firms, and a huge merged firm. The merged entity owns capital \( k_M = k + k/2 = 3k/2 \). We use Proposition 1 to derive equilibrium firm value after an asymmetric merger:

**Proposition 4** Consider an asymmetric merger between a large firm and a small firm in the small-large oligopoly industry. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. After this merger, the equilibrium firm value is given by:

\[
V_a^f (y; n - 1) = \frac{\Pi_a^f (n - 1) y^2}{r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}, \quad \text{for } f = s, l, M, \tag{24}
\]

where

\[
\Pi_s^0 (n - 1) = \frac{a^2 (b + k^{-1})^3}{[\Delta(n) - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2 + 3k\sigma}\right)]^2}, \tag{25}
\]

\[
\Pi_l^0 (n - 1) = \frac{a^2 (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1}/2)}{[\Delta(n) - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2 + 3k\sigma}\right)]^2}, \tag{26}
\]

\[
\Pi_M^0 (n - 1) = \frac{3a^2 (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1})^2 (3b + k^{-1})}{[\Delta(n) - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2 + 3k\sigma}\right)]^2}. \tag{27}
\]

The benefit from an asymmetric merger is given by:

\[
V_M^a (y; n - 1) - V_s (y; n) - V_l (y; n) = \frac{[\Pi_M^0 (n - 1) - \Pi_s^0 (n) - \Pi_l^0 (n)] y^2}{r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}. \tag{28}
\]

For there to be an incentive to merge, the expression in equation (28) must be positive. As in Proposition 3, we have the result:

**Proposition 5** Consider an asymmetric merger between a small firm and a large firm in the small-large oligopoly industry. Let \( \Delta(n) \) be given in (14) and let the critical value \( \Delta^* \) take the value:

\[
\Delta^* \equiv \frac{b^2}{1 - D \left(1 + \frac{2}{2 + 3b\sigma}\right)}, \tag{29}
\]

where \( D \) is given by:

\[
D \equiv \frac{(b + k^{-1}) (b + 2k^{-1})}{3b + 2k^{-1}} \sqrt{\frac{3 (3b + k^{-1})}{(b + k^{-1})^3 + (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1}/2)}}. \tag{30}
\]

Then parts (i)-(iii) in Proposition 3 apply here.
To facilitate the analysis in Section 3, we make the following assumption.

**Assumption 2** Suppose \( \Pi^a_M (n-1) - \Pi_s (n) - \Pi_l (n) > 0 \) and \( \Pi_l (n+1) - 2 \Pi_s (n) < 0 \) so that there is an incentive to merge between a large firm and a small firm, but no incentive to merge between two small firms.

A sufficient condition for this assumption is that case (i) or (iii) holds in Proposition 5, but both cases are violated in Proposition 3. We invoke an alternative assumption for the analysis in Section 4.

**Assumption 3** Suppose \( \Pi_l (n+1) - 2 \Pi_s (n) > 0 \) and \( \Pi^a_M (n-1) - \Pi_s (n) - \Pi_l (n) > 0 \) so that there is an incentive to merge between a large and a small firm and between two small firms.

A sufficient condition for this assumption is that case (i) or (iii) holds in both Propositions 3 and 5. The following lemma is useful for our later merger analysis:

**Lemma 1** Under Assumptions 2 or 3, the profit differentials \( \Pi^a_M (n-1) - \Pi_s (n) - \Pi_l (n) \) increase with the parameters \( a \) and \( n \), and the profit ratios \( [\Pi^a_M (n-1) - \Pi_s (n) - \Pi_l (n)] / \Pi_s (n) \) and \( [\Pi^a_M (n-1) - \Pi_s (n) - \Pi_l (n)] / \Pi_l (n) \) increase with the parameter \( n \).

To interpret this lemma, recall that the parameter \( n \) represents the number of large firms in the industry prior to a merger. This parameter proxies for industry concentration. A higher value of \( n \) represents a higher level of industry concentration. The parameter \( a \) represents the exposure of industry demand to the industrywide shock. A higher value of \( a \) implies that the increase in industry price is higher in response to an increase in the exogenous demand shock. Lemma 1 then demonstrates that under certain conditions the anticompetitive gains from a merger measured in terms of either profit differential or profit ratio are larger in more concentrated industries. In terms of profit differential, these gains are also greater in industries that are more exposed to industrywide shocks.

**Example 1.** The conditions in Assumption 2 or 3 are not easy to check analytically. We thus use a numerical example to illustrate them and Propositions 3 and 5. The baseline parameter values are: \( b = 0.5, k = 0.2, \) and \( K = 1 \). By equation (1), these values imply that the numbers of large and small firms must satisfy \( 2n + m = 10 \).
Figure 1 shows the profit differentials of symmetric and asymmetric mergers for a wide range of parameter values of $b$ and $n$. Both profit differentials increase monotonically with the number of large firms $n$, but non-monotonically with the price sensitivity parameter $b$. Intuitively, this non-monotonicity results from two opposing effects of a decline in $b$; that is, it raises price, but reduces output. Thus, change in the price sensitivity parameter has an ambiguous effect on the profit differentials, because it depends on whether the price effect or the quantity effect dominates.

From the lower left end of the surfaces in Figure 1, we find that asymmetric mergers can be profitable, while symmetric mergers are not, so Assumption 2 is satisfied. This happens, for example, when $b = 0.5$, and $n$ takes values from 1 to 5. When $b = 0.4$, and $n$ takes values from 1 to 5, however, both symmetric and asymmetric mergers are profitable, so Assumption 3 is satisfied.

2.4 Discussion

In this section, we provide further discussions on two of our main modeling choices. First, we have assumed that firms can grow only through a takeover and that internal investment or new entry is not allowed. From a technical point of view, if firms can invest internally by adjusting capital continuously over time, the capital stock is a state variable. As a result, our analysis would involve a two-dimensional combined stopping and control problem, which is very hard to solve. From an economic point of view, Lambrecht (2004) elaborates on the choice between internal investment and external acquisitions, and his discussion also applies to our setting.

Introducing continuous entry into the model would be interesting, but might complicate the analysis significantly. Intuitively, entry may erode anticompetitive profits. When sunk entry costs are sufficiently high, however, there is too little opportunity created by an anticompetitive merger to induce entry, as Werden and Froeb (1998) show. Pesendorfer (2005) analyzes dynamic mergers under continuous entry. He assumes, however, that firms are identical and operate at a constant average cost, as in Salant et al. (1983). In contrast to Salant et al. (1983), he shows that a merger to monopoly may not be profitable and a merger in a non-concentrated industry can be profitable.

Second, we have assumed that mergers between two large firms or further mergers over time are not allowed. Instead, we allow only two small firms to merge or a large firm and a small firm to merge. This assumption makes our analysis tractable and permits us to focus on the key questions.
of how product market competition interacts with bidder competition and how product market competition influences the timing and terms of mergers as well as merger returns. We can justify this assumption by invoking antitrust law. White (1987, p. 16) writes that: “[antitrust] Guidelines use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as their primary market concentration guide, with concentration levels of 1,000 and 1,800 as their two key levels. Any merger in a market with a post-merger HHI below 1,000 is unlikely to be challenged; a merger in a market with a post-merger HHI above 1,800 is likely to be challenged (if the merger partners have market shares that cause the HHI to increase by more than 100), unless other mitigating circumstances exist, like easy entry. Mergers in markets with post-concentration HHI levels between 1,000 and 1,800 require further analysis before a decision is made whether to challenge.” In our model, a merger of two large firms would raise industry concentration to a higher level than a merger of two small firms or a merger between a small firm and a large firm. The industry concentration level following a merger of two large firms is more likely to cross the regulatory threshold, and thus such a merger is more likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities.7

3 Mergers with a single bidder

In this section, we analyze the timing and terms of a merger between a small firm target and a large firm bidder. We suppose Assumption 2 holds, so that two identical small firms do not have an incentive to merge, but a large firm and a small firm do have an incentive to merge. This case is interesting because mergers typically involve acquisitions of a small firm by a large firm. In Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford’s (2001) sample of 4,256 deals over the 1973–1998 period, the median target size is 11.7% of the size of the acquirer. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) measure relative size as transaction value divided by acquirer’s equity value, and report averages of 19.2% (50.2%) for 5,503 small (6,520 large) acquirers between 1980 and 2001. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2007) also document positive and significant differences in market equity valuations of bidders and targets.

We assume the acquirer submits a bid in the form of an ownership share of the merged firm’s equity.8 Given this bid, both acquirer and target shareholders select their value-maximizing merger returns. We can justify this assumption by invoking antitrust law. White (1987, p. 16) writes that: “[antitrust] Guidelines use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as their primary market concentration guide, with concentration levels of 1,000 and 1,800 as their two key levels. Any merger in a market with a post-merger HHI below 1,000 is unlikely to be challenged; a merger in a market with a post-merger HHI above 1,800 is likely to be challenged (if the merger partners have market shares that cause the HHI to increase by more than 100), unless other mitigating circumstances exist, like easy entry. Mergers in markets with post-concentration HHI levels between 1,000 and 1,800 require further analysis before a decision is made whether to challenge.” In our model, a merger of two large firms would raise industry concentration to a higher level than a merger of two small firms or a merger between a small firm and a large firm. The industry concentration level following a merger of two large firms is more likely to cross the regulatory threshold, and thus such a merger is more likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities.7

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timing. In equilibrium, the merger timing chosen by the acquirer and the target are the same. The merger offers participants in the deal an option to exchange one asset for another. That is, they can exchange their shares in the initial firm for a fraction of the shares of the merged firm. Thus, the merger opportunity is analogous to an exchange option (Margrabe, 1978). The equilibrium timing and terms of the merger are the outcome of an option exercise game in which each participant determines an exercise strategy for its exchange option (see Grenadier, 2002, Lambrecht, 2004, and Morelec and Zhdanov, 2005). We first solve for the equilibrium, and then show that the equilibrium timing is globally optimal.

3.1 Equilibrium

To solve for the equilibrium, we first consider the exercise strategy of the large firm bidder. Let $\xi_l$ denote the ownership share of the large firm in the merged entity. Then $1 - \xi_l$ is the ownership share of the small firm target. The merger surplus accruing to the large firm is given by the positive part of the (net) payoff from the merger: $[\xi_l V_M^n (y; n - 1) - V_l (y; n) - X_l]^+$, where $V_M^n (y; n - 1)$ and $V_l (y; n)$ are given in Propositions 2 and 4. When it considers a merger, the large firm trades off the stochastic benefit from merging against the fixed cost $X_l$ of merging. Since firms have the option but not the obligation to merge, the surplus from merging has a call option feature.

Let $y_l^*$ denote the merger threshold selected by the large firm. The value of this firm’s option to merge, denoted $OM_l (y, y_l^*, \xi_l; n)$ for $y \leq y_l^*$, is given by:

$$OM_l (y, y_l^*, \xi_l; n) = \mathbb{E}^y \left\{ e^{-rt_{y_l^*}} \left[ \xi_l V_M^n \left( Y(t_{y_l^*}); n - 1 \right) - V_l \left( Y(t_{y_l^*}); n \right) - X_l \right] \right\},$$

where $t_{y_l^*}$ denotes the first passage time of the process $(Y_t)$ starting from the value $y$ to the merger threshold $y_l^*$ selected by the large firm. By a standard argument (e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1999), we can show that

$$OM_l (y, y_l^*, \xi_l; n) = [\xi_l V_M^n (y_l^*; n - 1) - V_l (y_l^*; n) - X_l] \left( \frac{y}{y_l^*} \right)^\beta,$$

where $\beta$ denotes the positive root of the characteristic equation

$$0.5 \sigma^2 \beta (\beta - 1) + \mu \beta - r = 0.$$  

Note that it is straightforward to prove that $\beta > 2$ under Assumption 1. Equation (32) admits an intuitive interpretation. The value of the option to merge is equal to the merger surplus, we also analyze a hostile takeover as in Lambrecht (2004). We do not consider this case here since it does not bring a significant new insight.
\[ [\xi_i V_M^0 (y_i^*; n - 1) - V_t (y_t^*; n) - X_t], \text{ generated at the time of the merger multiplied by a discount factor } (y/y_t^*)^\beta. \] This discount factor can be interpreted as the Arrow-Debreu price of a primary claim that delivers $1 at the time and in the state the merger occurs. It can also be regarded as the probability of the demand shock \( Y_t(\tau) \) reaching the merger threshold \( y_t^* \) for the first time from below, given that the current level of the demand shock is \( y \).

The optimal threshold \( y_t^* \) selected by the large firm maximizes the value of the merger option (32). Thus, it satisfies the first-order condition:

\[
\frac{\partial OM_l(y, y_t^*, \xi_l; n)}{\partial y_t^*} = 0. \tag{34}
\]

Solving this equation yields:

\[
y_t^* = \sqrt{\frac{\beta X_t}{\beta - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}} \left(1 - \xi_l\right) \Pi_M (n - 1) - \Pi_t (n) \tag{35}
\]

It follows that, as a function of \( \xi_l \), \( y_t^* \) declines with \( \xi_l \). This function gives the merger threshold for a given value of the ownership share \( \xi_l \).

We next turn to the exercise strategy of the small firm target, which can be solved in a similar fashion. The value of the small firm target’s option to merge is given by:

\[
OM_s (y, y_s^*, \xi_l; n) = [(1 - \xi_l) V_M^0 (y_s^*; n - 1) - V_s (y_s^*; n) - X_s] \left(\frac{y}{y_s^*}\right)^\beta. \tag{36}
\]

The optimal exercise strategy \( y_s^* \) selected by the small firm target satisfies the first-order condition:

\[
\frac{\partial OM_s(y, y_s^*, \xi_l; n)}{\partial y_s^*} = 0. \tag{37}
\]

Solving this equation yields:

\[
y_s^* = \sqrt{\frac{\beta X_s}{\beta - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}} \left(1 - \xi_l\right) \Pi_M (n - 1) - \Pi_t (n) \tag{38}
\]

This equation implies that, as a function of \( \xi_l \), the merger threshold \( y_s^* \) selected by the small firm target rises with \( \xi_l \).

In equilibrium, the negotiated ownership share must be such that the bidder and the target agree on merger timing, or \( y_t^* = y_s^* \). Using this condition, we can solve for the equilibrium timing and terms of the merger.
Proposition 6 Consider an asymmetric merger between a large firm and a small firm. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. (i) The value-maximizing restructuring policy is to merge when the industry shock \((Y_t)\) reaches the threshold value:

\[
y^* = \sqrt{\frac{\beta (X_s + X_l)}{\beta - 2} r - 2 \left( \mu + \sigma^2/2 \right)} \frac{1}{\Pi_M^2 (n - 1) - \Pi_l(n) - \Pi_s(n)}. \tag{39}
\]

(ii) The merger threshold \(y^*\) declines with \(a\) and \(n\). (iii) The share of the merged firm accruing to the large firm is given by:

\[
\xi^*_l = \frac{X_l}{X_s + X_l} + \frac{\Pi_l(n) X_s - \Pi_s(n) X_l}{(X_s + X_l) \Pi_M^2 (n - 1)}.
\tag{40}
\]

(iv) The ownership share \(\xi^*_l\) declines with \(n\).

Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6 characterize the merger timing. As the values of the option to merge for both firms increase with the realization \(y\) of the industry shock, a merger occurs in a rising product market. Thus, consistent with empirical evidence documented by Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), cyclical product markets generate procyclical mergers. This result is also consistent with Mitchell and Mulherin’s (1996) empirical finding that industry shocks contribute to the merger and restructuring activities during the 1980s.

As is well known, the merger threshold \(y^*\) given in (39) determines the merger timing and merger likelihood. A higher value of the merger threshold implies a larger value of the expected time of the merger and a lower probability of merger within a given time horizon.\(^9\) To interpret equation (39), we use Propositions 2 and 4 to rewrite it as:

\[
V_M^n (y^*, n - 1) - V_l (y^*; n) - V_s (y^*; n) = \frac{\beta (X_s + X_l)}{\beta - 2} > X_s + X_l.
\tag{41}
\]

Equation (41) implies that, at the time of the merger, the benefit from the merger exceeds the sum of the merger costs \(X_s + X_l\). This reflects the option value of waiting. Because mergers and acquisitions are analogous to an irreversible investment under uncertainty, the standard comparative statics results from the real options literature (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) apply to merger timing. For

\[^9\]The probability that a merger will take place in a time interval \([0, T]\) is given by:

\[
\Pr \left( \sup_{0 \leq \tau \leq T} Y (\tau) \geq y^* \right) = \mathcal{N} \left[ \frac{\ln (y_0/y^*) + (\mu - \sigma^2/2) T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \right] + \left( \frac{y_0}{y^*} \right)^{-2\mu/\sigma^2} \mathcal{N} \left[ \frac{\ln (y_0/y^*) - (\mu - \sigma^2/2) T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \right],
\]

where \(\mathcal{N}\) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This probability declines with the merger threshold \(y^*\).
example, an increase in the industry’s demand uncertainty delays the timing of mergers, and an increase in the drift of the industry’s demand shock speeds up the timing of mergers.

Our novel comparative statics results are related to industry characteristics. First, part (ii) of Proposition 6 implies that the optimal merger threshold declines with the parameter $a$. Since the parameter $a$ represents the exposure of the industry demand to the exogenous shock, one should expect to observe more mergers and acquisitions in industries where demand is more exposed to or more sensitive to exogenous shocks. The intuition behind this result is that an increase in the parameter $a$ raises industry demand for a given positive shock. Thus, it increases anticompetitive gains $\Pi_M^2(n - 1) - \Pi_M(n) - \Pi_s(n)$ as shown in Lemma 1, thereby raising the benefits from merging. This result is consistent with empirical evidence in Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), who report that the industries experiencing the most merger and restructuring activity in the 1980s were the industries exposed most to industry shocks.

We next turn to the effect of industry concentration on merger timing. Part (ii) of Proposition 6 implies that one should expect to see more mergers and acquisitions in more concentrated (i.e., less competitive) industries. The economic intuition behind this result is simple. A higher level of pre-merger industry concentration is associated with higher anticompetitive profits by Lemma 1, which raises the incentive to merge, ceteris paribus. In particular, higher anticompetitive profits lead to greater restructuring benefits, and so firms in less competitive industries will optimally exercise their option to merge earlier.

This implication for the optimal timing of mergers in our Cournot–Nash framework is in sharp contrast to most of the earlier findings in the real options literature. Notably, Grenadier (2002) demonstrates that firms in more competitive industries will optimally exercise their investment options earlier in a symmetric industry equilibrium model with irreversible investment. We attribute the difference in our results to differences in the economic modeling of industry competition and structure. In our asymmetric industry equilibrium model, anticompetitive profits result from merging two firms to form a new firm, which alters product market competition endogenously. In Grenadier’s (2002) model, anticompetitive profits result from exogenously reducing the number of identical firms that compete for an investment opportunity in the industry. Moreover, Grenadier (2002) studies an incremental investment problem, while we analyze a single discrete option exercise decision. We will consider scarcity of targets that can lead to competition among multiple bidders in Section 4. Bidder competition will hurt the acquirer, as is also shown by Morellec and Zhdanov.
(2005), and hence will potentially attenuate the delayed option exercise due to the product market effects that are central to our model.

Parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 6 characterize the ownership share. Part (iii) shows that the large firm bidder demands a greater ownership share than the small firm target if the two firms incur identical merger costs $X_l = X_s$. Intuitively, because the large firm has a higher pre-merger firm value, it demands a greater ownership share. This result is consistent with Lambrecht (2004) who assumes that mergers are motivated by economies of scale. We show, however, that the pre-merger industry concentration level also influences the ownership share. Part (iv) of Proposition 6 shows that a large merging firm demands a smaller ownership share in more concentrated industries, \textit{ceteris paribus}. The intuition is that the pre-merger profit differential between the large and the small merging partners relative to the value of the merged firm declines with industry concentration. Thus, the large firm does not need to demand a greater share in more concentrated industries.

3.2 Cumulative merger returns

We now turn to cumulative returns resulting from an asymmetric merger. The equity value of a large merging firm before a merger, denoted $E_l (Y(t); n)$, is equal to the value of its assets in place plus the value of the merger option:

$$E_l (Y(t); n) = V_l (Y(t); n) + OM_l (Y(t), y^*, \xi^*_l; n), \hspace{1cm} (42)$$

where $OM_l (Y(t), y^*, \xi^*_l; n)$ is given in equation (32), and $y^*$ and $\xi^*_l$ are given in Proposition 6. Similarly, the equity value of a small merging firm before the merger, denoted $E_s (Y(t); n)$, is given by:

$$E_s (Y(t); n) = V_s (Y(t); n) + OM_s (Y(t), y^*, \xi^*_l; n), \hspace{1cm} (43)$$

where $OM_s (\cdot; n)$ is defined in (36).

We may express the cumulative merger returns as a fraction of the stand-alone equity value $V_f (Y(t); n)$ of the small firm $f = s$ and the large firm $f = l$. That is, the cumulative returns to the small and large merging firms at time $t \leq \tau_{y^*}$ are given by:

$$R_{f,M} (Y(t), n) = \frac{E_f (Y(t); n) - V_f (Y(t); n)}{V_f (Y(t); n)} = \frac{OM_f (Y(t), y^*, \xi^*_l; n)}{V_f (Y(t); n)}, \hspace{1cm} (44)$$

for $f = s, l$. The cumulative return to the merging firm $f$ at the time of the merger announcement is equal to the expression in equation (44) evaluated at $t = \tau_{y^*}$ or $Y(t) = y^*$. 18
Similarly, we can compute the cumulative merger return to a rival firm at the time of the merger announcement. To do so, we first compute the equity value of a rival firm prior to the announcement of a merger at date \( t \leq \tau_{y^*} \). It is equal to the value of assets in place before the merger plus an option value from the merger:

\[
V_f(Y(t); n) + \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-r(\tau_{y^*} - t)} \left( V^a_f(Y(\tau_{y^*}); n - 1) - V_f(Y(\tau_{y^*}); n) \right) \right] Y(t),
\]

for \( f = s, l \). This option value results from the fact that the value of the rival firm becomes \( V^a_f(Y(\tau_{y^*}); n - 1) \) after the asymmetric merger since there are \( n - 1 \) large firms, \( m - 1 \) small firms, and a huge merged firm in the industry. We then define the cumulative return to a small or large rival firm before the merger as:

\[
R_{f,R}(Y(t); n) = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-r(\tau_{y^*} - t)} \left( V^a_f(Y(\tau_{y^*}); n - 1) - V_f(Y(\tau_{y^*}); n) \right) \right] Y(t)}{V_f(Y(t); n)}.
\]

for \( f = s, l \). We focus on the cumulative return at the time of the merger announcement, when \( t = \tau_{y^*} \) or \( Y(\tau_{y^*}) = y^* \). The next proposition characterizes these returns:

**Proposition 7** Consider an asymmetric merger between a large firm and a small firm. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. (i) The cumulative merger returns to the small and large merging firms at the time of restructuring are given by

\[
R_{f,M}(y^*; n) = \frac{2 \Pi^a_M(n - 1) - \Pi_l(n) - \Pi_s(n)}{\Pi_f(n)} \frac{X_f}{X_s + X_l},
\]

for \( f = s, l \). (ii) The cumulative merger returns to a small or a large rival firm at the time of restructuring are given by

\[
R_{f,R}(y^*; n) = \left[ 1 - \frac{b^2}{\Delta(n)} \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2 + 3bk} \right) \right]^{-2} - 1,
\]

for \( f = s, l \). (iii) All the above returns are positive and increase with \( n \).

Proposition 7 highlights several interesting aspects of cumulative merger returns in our Cournot-Nash framework. First, equation (47) reveals that the cumulative returns to the two merging firms have three determinants, including an anticompetitive effect, a size effect, and a hysteresis effect. The hysteresis effect is represented by \( \beta \). It implies that more uncertainty leads to higher cumulative returns to both the acquirer and the target. With more uncertainty, the merger option is exercised when it is deeper in the money, resulting in higher cumulative merger returns. The size effect
reflects the fact that the large merging firm or the firm with a lower merger cost has a lower return than the small merging firm or the firm with a higher merger cost.

Lambrecht (2004) derives the size and hysteresis effects in the presence of economies of scale. Unlike his model, our model with constant returns to scale does not produce a synergy effect. Instead, we have an anticompetitive and cost reduction effect represented by the term $\Pi_M^a (n - 1) - \Pi_I (n) - \Pi_s (n)$, which characterizes the merger benefits. This effect reflects the fact that after a merger, there are fewer small and large firms in the industry, and a huge merged entity emerges. Hence, both the market structure and the competitive landscape of the industry change. In addition, the huge merged firm combines the assets of the two merging firms, thereby reducing production costs. The term $[\Pi_M^a (n - 1) - \Pi_I (n) - \Pi_s (n)]/\Pi_f (n)$ therefore indicates the percentage gain in profits. Notably, this percentage gain differs for a small and a large merging firm as it depends on the firm’s size and its relative contribution to the merger benefits.

Second, merging firms have higher cumulative returns in more concentrated industries. The intuition is that there is a stronger anticompetitive effect on the industry’s equilibrium price after a merger in those industries. As a consequence, merging firms derive higher merger returns.

Third, equation (48) reveals that the cumulative return to a small or a large rival firm at the time of a merger announcement is positive too. Like the cumulative returns to merging firms, the cumulative returns to rival firms increase with industry concentration. The intuition is that the industry’s equilibrium price rises after the merger, and rival firms also benefit from this price increase. This benefit increases with industry concentration. Like merger returns, rival returns are therefore higher in more concentrated industries. Notice, however, that the magnitude of rival returns does not depend on firm size, as rival firms do not change their capital stock but only adjust their output.

Example 2. We illustrate Proposition 7 by a numerical example with baseline parameter values: $a = 100$, $b = 0.5$, $k = 0.2$, $n = 2$, $r = 8\%$, $X_l = 2$, $X_s = 2$, $\mu = 1\%$, and $\sigma = 20\%$. Note that we set $X_l = X_s$ to focus on the portion of cumulative returns that is due not simply to difference in restructuring costs.

[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Figure 2 graphs the returns of a small merging firm (dashed line) and a large merging firm (dotted line) given in equation (47) as well as the return to a rival firm (solid line) given in equation (48) as functions of the price sensitivity of demand $b$ and the number of large firms $n$. The figure reveals several interesting aspects of the fundamental determinants of merger and rival returns, such as firm size, profitability, and the firm’s contribution to the creation of the merger benefit. First, the cumulative return of a small merging firm always exceeds the cumulative return of a large merging firm. Second, the cumulative merger returns vary non-monotonically with the price sensitivity of demand $b$. Interestingly, rival returns, however, increases with $b$. Industry rivals benefit from the price effect and are not hurt by the quantity effect. In fact, because rivals do not change their firm size, they select a slightly higher quantity after a takeover. Third, a higher level of industry concentration leads unambiguously to higher returns for all firms in the industry.

In our model, total merger returns come from the merger surplus. The merger surplus is generated by two incentives to merge: (i) gaining market power, and (ii) reducing production costs. As Perry and Porter (1985) and Salant et al. (1983) note, the gain in market power alone may not be sufficient to motivate a merger. To illustrate this point, we decompose the total merger surplus (net of merger costs) evaluated at the equilibrium merger threshold $y^*$ into two components:

$$V_M^*(y^*; n - 1) - V_l(y^*; n) - V_s(y^*; n) - X_l - X_s = \frac{V_M^*(y^*; n) - V_l(y^*; n) - V_s(y^*; n) - X_l - X_s}{S_1} + \frac{V_M^*(y^*; n) - \tilde{V}_M(y^*; n)}{S_2},$$

(49)

where $\tilde{V}_M(y^*; n)$ represents the value of the merged firm when there is no cost saving. We compute this value using Proposition 1 by assuming that the merged firm uses the large firm’s capital stock $k$ to produce output and does not combine the two merging firms’ capital assets to reduce production costs. Thus, the expressions $S_1$ and $S_2$ on the right-hand side of equation (49) represent the merger surplus attributed to market power and cost savings, respectively.

Table 1 illustrates these two components numerically for various values of $n$. One can see the effects of market power on the benefits (and hence returns) from mergers within our framework. First, note that the total merger surplus at the merger threshold is independent of $n$ because it is equal to $2(X_s + X_l)/\beta$ by equation (41). Second, the large firm and the small firm do not have
incentives to merge if the motivation is market power alone. That is, the associated merger surplus \( S_1 \) is negative, even though the value of the merged firm is higher than the value of each merging firm. Third, it is the additional cost savings incentive represented by \( S_2 \) that makes the merger profitable. Thus, the merger benefits in our numerical example are attributable largely to cost savings. Finally, the table also reveals that the market power incentive is still present, although it does not motivate the merger by itself. This is because market power effect has a stronger effect as the industry becomes more concentrated (i.e., \( n \) is higher). Consequently, the component \( S_2 \) of the merger surplus generated by cost savings declines as the industry becomes more concentrated.

### 3.3 Global optimality

As in Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), the equilibrium merger timing analyzed in Section 3.1 is globally optimal. Formally, consider a central planner who selects the merger timing to maximize the total surplus from the merger. This globally optimal equilibrium solves the following problem:

\[
\max_{\tau} \mathbb{E}^\mu \left\{ e^{-r\tau} \left[ V_M^g (Y_\tau; n - 1) - V_s (Y_\tau; n) - V_l (Y_\tau; n) - X_s - X_l \right] \right\}. \tag{50}
\]

One can verify that the surplus-maximizing policy is characterized by the trigger policy whereby the two firms merge the first time the process reaches the threshold \( y^* \) given in Proposition 6. This suggests that, to solve for the equilibrium, one can first solve for the globally optimal merger timing and then solve for the sharing rule so that the globally optimal merger timing is also optimal to each of the two merging partners.

### 4 Bidder competition and industry competition

So far, we have focused on an asymmetric merger with a single bidder. We now consider two bidders who compete for a small firm target. One bidder is a small firm, and the other is a large firm. We suppose Assumption 3 holds, so that both bidders have incentives to merge with the target. As Fishman (1988) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) argue, bidder competition puts the target in an advantageous position and allows target shareholders to extract a higher premium from the bidding firms. Our work is different in that we do not consider asymmetric information, and merger benefits are endogenously derived from an industry equilibrium in our model rather than exogenously specified. Thus, product market competition plays an important role.
Our analysis of Nash equilibria in a takeover contest follows similar steps as in Morellec and Zhdanov (2005). Once the contest is initiated, the two bidding firms submit bids to the target in the form of a fraction of the merged firm’s equity to be owned by target shareholders upon the takeover. The bidder who offers the highest value to the target shareholders wins the contest. Given the winner’s ownership share, the winning bidder and the target select their merger timing independently. In equilibrium, they must agree on the merger timing.

In our model, a large firm has a production cost advantage over a small firm. Thus, the value of the merged firm is higher when the small firm target merges with a large firm bidder than when it merges with a small firm bidder. Formally, we can use equations (17) and (27) to show that

$$V_M^a (y; n - 1) > V_l (y; n + 1).$$  \hspace{1cm} (51)

Equation (51) implies that the large firm will win the takeover contest as long as the takeover is profitable to it because it can always copy the small firm bidder’s bid and deliver more value to target shareholders. This copying strategy is costly to the large firm when its merger costs are higher than the small firm bidder’s merger costs. In this case, the takeover may not be profitable to the large firm bidder, and it would rather drop out.

From the preceding discussions, we conclude that either the large firm or the small firm may win the takeover contest, depending on the relative effects of production and merger costs. Before analyzing these two possibilities, we define the breakeven share $\xi_{BE}^s$ for the small firm bidder as

$$\xi_{BE}^s V_l (y; n + 1) - V_s (y; n) - X_s = 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (52)

If the small firm bidder places a bid higher than $1 - \xi_{BE}^s$, then it will realize a negative value by entering the deal. In this case, the small firm bidder would be better off losing the takeover contest. Similarly, we define the breakeven share $\xi_{BE}^l$ for the large firm bidder as

$$\xi_{BE}^l V_M^a (y; n - 1) - V_l (y; n) - X_l = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (53)

We now discuss the bidders’ strategies by considering the following cases (ignoring cases of ties):

1. The large firm bidder wins the contest. In this case, the losing small firm bidder may still influence equilibrium, depending on whether it is strong or weak.

   (a) The losing small firm bidder is weak in the sense that merging with the large firm bidder and accepting the ownership share $(1 - \xi^*_l)$ is more profitable to the target than merging
with the small firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_l^{BE})\):

\[
(1 - \xi_l^s) V^n_M(y; n - 1) > (1 - \xi_l^{BE}) V_l(y; n + 1), \tag{54}
\]

where \(\xi_l^s\) is the equilibrium share without bidder competition given in Proposition 6. In this case, for the small firm bidder to win, it must offer an ownership share of at least \((1 - \xi_l^{BE})\) to target shareholders. But this implies a negative net payoff to the small firm bidder. Thus, it would rather drop out of the takeover contest. The equilibrium is then the same as in the case of a single bidder.

(b) The small firm bidder is strong in the sense that merging with the large firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_l^s)\) is less profitable to the target than merging with the small firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_l^{BE})\):

\[
(1 - \xi_l^s) V^n_M(y; n - 1) < (1 - \xi_l^{BE}) V_l(y; n + 1). \tag{55}
\]

Under this condition, the small firm bidder has an incentive to bid an amount slightly less than \((1 - \xi_l^{BE})\) in order to win the contest. Anticipating this bidder’s competition, the large firm bidder will place a bid higher than \((1 - \xi_l^s)\) until equality holds in (55). We define \(\xi_l^{\text{max}}\) as the ownership share satisfying this equality:

\[
(1 - \xi_l^{\text{max}}) V^n_M(y; n - 1) = (1 - \xi_l^{BE}) V_l(y; n + 1). \tag{56}
\]

The value \(\xi_l^{\text{max}}\) is the maximum share that the large firm bidder can extract from the merged firm such that it still wins the takeover contest. If the large firm demands a share higher than \(\xi_l^{\text{max}}\), or places a bid lower than \((1 - \xi_l^{\text{max}})\), the small firm will outbid the large firm and win the contest. Thus, the best response of the large firm is to place a bid \((1 - \xi_l^{\text{max}})\). Note that the ownership share \(\xi_l^{\text{max}}\) of the large firm bidder must be greater than the breakeven share \(\xi_l^{BE}\) for the large firm to participate. If this condition is violated, the large firm would rather drop out.

2. The small firm bidder wins the contest. As in Case 1, the losing large firm bidder may influence equilibrium, depending on whether it is strong or weak.

   (a) The losing large firm bidder is weak in the sense that merging with the small firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_l^s)\) is more profitable to the target than merging
with the large firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_s^{BE})\):

\[
(1 - \xi_s^*) V_l (y; n + 1) > (1 - \xi_s^{BE}) V_{MM}^a (y; n - 1),
\]

where \(\xi_s^*\) is the equilibrium ownership share when the small firm is the only bidder. Similar to Case 1(a), the losing large bidder is too weak to matter, and the equilibrium is the same as in the case of a single bidder.

(b) The losing large firm bidder is strong in the sense that merging with the small firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_s^*)\) is less profitable to the target than merging with the large firm bidder and accepting the ownership share \((1 - \xi_l^{BE})\):

\[
(1 - \xi_s^*) V_l (y; n + 1) < (1 - \xi_l^{BE}) V_{MM}^a (y; n - 1).
\]

In this case, the winning small firm bidder will raise its bid and offer an ownership share such that the large firm bidder is just willing to drop out. This ownership share \(\xi_s^{\text{max}}\) is defined as the value satisfying the equation:

\[
(1 - \xi_s^{\text{max}}) V_l (y; n + 1) = (1 - \xi_l^{BE}) V_{MM}^a (y; n - 1).
\]

Given the above bidding strategies, the winning bidder will select a merger time to maximize the option value to merge. The target shareholders also select a merger time to maximize their option value to merge, given the ownership share proposed by the winning bidder. The equilibrium ownership share is determined so that the merger timing selected by the winning bidder and the target shareholders agrees.

Proposition 8 presents the equilibrium solution in the four cases:

**Proposition 8** Consider a small firm bidder and a large firm bidder competing for a small firm target. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Let

\[
\Lambda (n) \equiv \frac{\Pi_M^a (n - 1) - \Pi_l (n) - \Pi_s (n)}{\Pi_l (n + 1) - 2 \Pi_s (n)}
\]

denote the relative merger benefits.

(i) If

\[
\frac{X_l}{X_s} < \frac{2 (\beta - 1) \Lambda (n)}{\beta} - 1,
\]

25
then the equilibrium is the same as that with a single large firm bidder described in Proposition 6. The cumulative returns to the winning large firm bidder and the small firm target are given in Proposition 7.

(ii) If
\[
\frac{2(\beta - 1) \Lambda(n)}{\beta} - 1 < \frac{X_l}{X_s} < \frac{2(\beta - 1) \Lambda(n)}{\beta - 2} - \frac{\beta}{\beta - 2},
\] (62)
then the large firm bidder wins the contest and the small firm bidder is strong. The share of the merged firm accruing to the winning large firm bidder is given by:
\[
\bar{\xi}_l^{\text{max}} = 1 - \frac{\beta \Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n)}{2(\beta - 1) \Pi_M^s(n-1)}.
\] (63)

In addition, the takeover takes place the first time the industry shock \(Y_t\) reaches the threshold value:
\[
y_{cl}^* = \sqrt{\frac{2(\beta - 1) X_s(r - 2(\mu + \sigma^2/2))}{(\beta - 2)(\beta - 1) \Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n)}}.
\] (64)
The cumulative returns to the winning large firm bidder and the small firm target are given by:
\[
R_{l,M}(y_{cl}^*; n) = \frac{\Pi_M^s(n-1) - \Pi_l(n) - \Pi_s(n)}{(\beta - 1) \Pi_l(n)} - \frac{(\beta - 2) X_l + \beta X_s \Pi_l(n+1) - 2 \Pi_s(n)}{(\beta - 1) X_s}.\] (65)

and
\[
R_{s,M}(y_{cl}^*; n) = \frac{\Pi_l(n+1) - 2 \Pi_s(n)}{(\beta - 1) \Pi_s(n)}.
\] (66)

(iii) If
\[
\frac{2(\beta - 1) \Lambda(n)}{\beta - 2} - \frac{\beta}{\beta - 2} < \frac{X_l}{X_s} < \frac{2\beta \Lambda(n)}{\beta - 2} - \frac{1}{2},
\] (67)
then the small firm bidder wins the contest and the large firm bidder is strong. The share of the merged firm accruing to the winning small firm bidder is given by:
\[
\bar{\xi}_s^{\text{max}} = 1 - \frac{\beta X_s \Pi_M^s(n-1) - \Pi_l(n)}{(\beta - 2) X_l + \beta X_s \Pi_l(n+1) - 2 \Pi_s(n)}.\] (68)

In addition, the takeover takes place the first time the industry shock \(Y_t\) reaches the threshold value:
\[
y_{cs}^* = \sqrt{\frac{(\beta - 2) X_l + \beta X_s}{\beta - 2} \frac{r - 2(\mu + \sigma^2/2)}{\Pi_M^s(n-1) - \Pi_l(n) - \Pi_s(n)}}.
\] (69)
The cumulative returns to the winning small firm bidder and the small firm target are given by:
\[
R_{s,M}(y_{cs}^*; n) = \frac{\Pi_l(n+1) - 2 \Pi_s(n)}{\Pi_s(n)} - \frac{2(\beta - 1) X_s}{(\beta - 2) X_l + \beta X_s} \frac{\Pi_M^s(n-1) - \Pi_l(n) - \Pi_s(n)}{\Pi_s(n)}.\] (70)
and
\[ R_{s,M}(y_{cs}; n) = \frac{2X_s}{(\beta - 2) X_l + \beta X_s} \frac{\Pi^q_M(n-1) - \Pi_l(n) - \Pi_s(n)}{\Pi_s(n)}. \] (71)

(iv) If
\[ \frac{X_l}{X_s} > \frac{2\beta \Lambda(n)}{\beta - 2} - \frac{1}{2}, \] (72)
then the small firm bidder wins the contest and the large firm bidder is weak. The equilibrium is the same as that with a single small firm bidder. The share of the merged firm accruing to the winning small firm bidder is given by \( \xi^*_s = 1/2 \), and the merger threshold is given by:
\[ \bar{y}^* = \sqrt{\frac{2\beta X_s}{\beta - 2} \left( r - 2(\mu + \sigma^2/2) \right) \Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n)}. \] (73)

The cumulative returns to the winning small firm bidder and the small firm target are given by:
\[ R_{s,M}(\bar{y}^*; n) = \frac{\Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n)}{\beta \Pi_s(n)}. \] (74)

Proposition 8 provides a complete characterization of equilibrium for all possible cases. As conditions (67) and (72) indicate, the small firm bidder can win the takeover contest if and only if the relative merger cost \( X_l/X_s \) of the large firm bidder is sufficiently high compared to the relative merger benefit \( \Lambda(n) \). Otherwise, the large firm bidder will win the takeover contest. We view that this case is more relevant in corporate practice as merger costs include fees to investment banks and lawyers, and should not vary substantially for firms of different sizes. We have also noted that large firm bidders and small firm targets are consistent with the empirical evidence. As Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) also report that competed deals are more likely for large acquirers than for small acquirers, which implies that large firm bidders tend to win more often in takeover contests, we focus on parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 8 henceforth.

Part (ii) shows that when the losing small firm bidder is strong, the target can extract additional returns from the winning bidder. That is, if condition (62) holds, the merger return to the winning bidder given in (65) is lower than without the bidder competition given in (47). In addition, the merger return to the target is greater than without bidder competition given in (47).

To interpret parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 8 further, we define the bid premium resulting from bidder competition as the percentage increase in the target equity value over the case without bidder competition. These equity values are evaluated at the equilibrium time of the merger. Clearly, there is a positive bid premium only if the losing bidder is strong as in part (ii). In this
case, we can formally define the bid premium resulting from bidder competition as
\[
(1 - \bar{\xi}_l^{\text{max}}) V_M^n(y_{cl}^*; n-1) - (1 - \xi_l^*) V_M^n(y_{cl}^*; n-1)
\]
\[
(1 - \xi_l^*) V_M^n(y_{cl}^*; n-1) = \xi_l^* - \bar{\xi}_l^{\text{max}}.
\]
(75)

We then use condition (62) and the expressions for \(\xi_l^*\) and \(\bar{\xi}_l^{\text{max}}\) to show that \(\xi_l^* > \bar{\xi}_l^{\text{max}}\). Consequently, the bid premium is positive. Note that both condition (62) and the bid premium depend on industry characteristics, such as the industry concentration level \(n\) and the price sensitivity of demand parameter \(b\). As a result, there is an interaction between product market competition and bidder competition in our model.

Example 3. A numerical example illustrates the results reported in Proposition 8, focusing on the interesting interactions between bidder competition and industry competition. Baseline parameter values are: \(a = 100\), \(k = 0.2\), \(K = 1\), \(b = 0.4\), \(n = 4\), \(r = 8\%\), \(\mu = 1\%\), and \(\sigma = 20\%\). To ensure that the large firm bidder wins the takeover contest and the small firm bidder can be potentially strong as in part (ii) of Proposition 8, we set \(X_l = 20\) and \(X_s = 1\) so that condition (62) holds.

[Insert Figure 3 Here]

Figure 3 displays the bid premium in equation (75) as a function of the number of large firms \(n\) and the price sensitivity \(b\) of demand. The figure highlights several key elements of the industry equilibrium with bidder competition. First, the left panel shows that the bid premium is first an increasing and then a declining function of the price sensitivity parameter \(b\). When \(b\) is low enough, the bid premium is close to zero. When \(b\) is high enough, condition (61) holds. As a result, the small firm bidder does not influence the equilibrium bidding process, and there is no bid premium.

Second, the right panel of the figure reveals that when the industry is sufficiently concentrated, bidder competition matters. In the numerical example, bidder competition induces an additional bid premium if there are at least three large firms in the industry. The premium increases with industry concentration.

Finally, we should point out that our model is stylized and cannot be calibrated precisely to the data. While the bid premium resulting from bidder competition in our setting can be higher for different parameter values, it is only one component of the combined run-up and markup, which could exceed 20\%, as documented by Schwert (1996).
5 Conclusion

This paper develops a real options model of mergers and acquisitions that jointly determines the industry’s product market equilibrium and the timing and terms of takeovers. The analysis explicitly recognizes the role of product market competition and derives equilibrium restructuring strategies by solving an option exercise game between bidding and target shareholders.

The model’s predictions are generally consistent with the extent empirical evidence. The model also generates some novel testable implications. First, increased product market competition among heterogeneous firms does not speed up the acquisition process. Anticompetitive profits from a merger in our model are greater for less competitive industries because of higher price adjustment at the time of a merger. As a result, we arrive perhaps surprisingly at the conclusion that firms in less competitive industries optimally exercise their real options earlier. Second, we show that the likelihood of merger activities and the magnitude of cumulative returns to both merging and rival firms are positively associated with industry concentration. In addition, mergers are more likely in industries that are more exposed to demand shocks. Third, we show that, assuming similar merger costs, the large firm bidder wins the takeover contest when competing with a small firm bidder for a small firm target. In addition, when an industry is concentrated enough, bidder competition induces an additional bid premium that increases with industry concentration. All these predictions are empirically testable in future research.

One limitation of our analysis is that we follow most research in the literature in assuming exogenous mergers in the sense that the merger structure (i.e., what firm merges with what firm, and which remains independent) is exogenously imposed in the absence of antitrust law. It would be interesting to consider endogenous mergers when each firm makes individual merger decisions and responds to mergers by other firms. In this case, multiple mergers may arise, and the order of mergers may be endogenous. This extension is nontrivial even in a static model; see, e.g., Qiu and Zhou (2007). Incorporating endogenous mergers into a dynamic model would be a fruitful topic for future research.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1: In the Cournot–Nash industry equilibrium, each firm \( i = 1, ..., N \) has the objective to

\[
\max_{q_i(t)} \pi_i(t) \quad (A.1)
\]

while taking other firms’ output strategies as given, where \( \pi_i(t) \) is defined in equation (4). This maximization problem has the first-order condition for each firm \( i \):

\[
a Y(t) - b Q(t) = (b + 2k_i^{-1}) q_i(t). \quad (A.2)
\]

Using (1) and (5), we can solve the system of first-order conditions (A.2) to obtain the equilibrium expression for \( q_i^*(t) \) in equation (7). Aggregating individual firms’ output choices yields the industry’s optimal output level \( Q^*(t) \) in equation (9). The industry’s equilibrium price process \( P^*(t) \) in equation (10) immediately follows from substituting \( Q^*(t) \) into equation (2) and simplifying.

Proof of Proposition 2: Using Proposition 1, we can derive firm \( i \)'s profits:

\[
\pi_i(t) = P q_i - q_i^2 / (2k_i) = \left( \frac{aY(t)}{1+B} \right)^2 \left( 1 - \frac{\theta_i}{2bk_i} \right) \frac{\theta_i}{b}. \quad (A.3)
\]

We need to substitute the values of \( \theta_i \) and \( k_i \) for a small, a large, or a merged firm to compute their profits and firm values. Substituting \( k_s = k/2 \) and \( k_l = k \), \( \theta_s = b/ (b + 2k^{-1}) \), and \( \theta_l = b/ (b + k^{-1}) \) into the expression of instantaneous operating profits in equation (A.3) produces the closed-form solutions in equations (16) and (17). Using these equations to evaluate equation (6), we can derive the expression for equilibrium firm value \( V_i(y; n) \) for \( i = s, l \) that is reported in equation (15).

Proof of Proposition 3: We first find the critical value \( \Delta^* \) in equation (19) by solving the equation

\[
\Pi_l(n + 1) - 2 \Pi_s(n) = 0. \quad (A.4)
\]

Economically, equation (A.4) represents a breakeven condition for the incentive to merge. Note that the functional form of \( \Delta(n) \) in equation (14) has the useful property:

\[
\Delta(n) = \Delta(n + 1) + b^2. \quad (A.5)
\]
Thus, using equations (16), and (17), we can write
\[ \Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n) = \frac{a^2 (b+2k^{-1})^2 (b+k^{-1}/2)}{\Delta (n+1)^2} - \frac{2 a^2 (b+k^{-1})^3}{\Delta (n)^2} \] (A.6)

When we insert equations (A.5) and (A.6) into the breakeven condition in equation (A.4), rearrange, and simplify, we obtain:
\[ \frac{2 a^2 (b+k^{-1})^3}{\Delta (n)^2} \left[ \frac{A^2}{(1-b^2/\Delta(n))^2} - 1 \right] = 0, \] (A.7)

where the positive constant \( A \) is given in equation (20). By solving equation (A.7) for \( \Delta(n) \), we can determine the critical value \( \Delta^* \) in equation (19). Since one can easily verify that the term \( \Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n) \) increases with the number of large firms, we can therefore derive the three conditions for the incentive to merge in equations (21), (22), and (23).

**Proof of Proposition 4:** Using Proposition 1, we can show that the post-merger output levels of a small firm and a large firm are given by
\[ q_s^a(t;n-1) = \frac{a (b+k^{-1})}{\Delta(n) - b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3k} \right)} Y(t), \] (A.8)
\[ q_l^a(t;n-1) = \frac{a (b+2k^{-1})}{\Delta(n) - b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3k} \right)} Y(t), \] (A.9)

and the merged firm produces output at the level
\[ q_M^a(t;n-1) = \frac{3a b}{2b+2k-\frac{3}{2}} \frac{(b+k^{-1})(b+2k^{-1})}{\Delta(n) - b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3k} \right)} Y(t). \] (A.10)

In addition, the post-merger industry output and price are given by
\[ Q^a(t;n-1) = \frac{a}{b} \left[ 1 - \frac{(b+k^{-1})(b+2k^{-1})}{\Delta(n) - b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3k} \right)} \right] Y(t), \] (A.11)
\[ P^a(t;n-1) = \frac{a (b+k^{-1})(b+2k^{-1})}{\Delta(n) - b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3k} \right)} Y(t). \] (A.12)

Substituting the equilibrium output choice \( q_s^a(t), q_l^a(t), \) and \( q_M^a(t) \) in equations (A.8), (A.9), and (A.10) with \( k_M = 3k/2 \) and \( \theta_M = b/\left( b + \frac{3}{2}k^{-1} \right) \) into the expression of instantaneous operating profits in equation (A.3) produces the closed-form solutions in equations (25), (26), and (27). Using these equations to evaluate equation (6), we can derive the expression for equilibrium firm value \( V^a_f(y;n-1) \) for \( f = s, l, M \) that is reported in equation (24).
Proof of Proposition 5: The arguments are similar to the proof of Proposition 3. We first find the critical value $\Delta^a$ in equation (29) by solving the equation

$$\Pi_M^a (n-1) - \Pi_s(n) - \Pi_f(n) = 0. \quad (A.13)$$

Using equations (16), (17), and (27), we express the breakeven condition (A.13) as follows:

$$\frac{3 (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1})^2 (3b + k^{-1}) / (3b + 2k^{-1})^2}{\Delta (n) - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2+3bk}\right)} - \frac{(b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1}/2) + (b + k^{-1})^3}{\Delta (n)^2} = 0. \quad (A.14)$$

After rearranging and simplifying, we can rewrite equation (A.14) as

$$\frac{(b + k^{-1}/2) (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1})^3}{\Delta (n)^2} \left[ \frac{D^2}{\left(1 - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2+3bk}\right) / \Delta (n) \right)^2 - 1} \right] = 0, \quad (A.15)$$

where the positive constant $D$ is given in equation (30). By solving equation (A.15) for $\Delta(n)$, we can determine the critical value $\Delta^a$ in equation (29). Since one can easily verify that the term $\Pi_M^a (n-1) - \Pi_s(n) - \Pi_f(n)$ increases with the number of large firms, we can therefore derive the three conditions for the incentive to merge that correspond to equations (21), (22), and (23).

Proof of Lemma 1: We use Propositions 2 and 4 to show that

$$\Pi_M^a (n-1) - \Pi_s(n) - \Pi_f(n) \quad (A.16)$$

$$= \frac{3a^2 (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1})^2 (3b + k^{-1}) / (3b + 2k^{-1})^2}{\Delta (n) - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2+3bk}\right)}$$

$$- \frac{a^2 (b + k^{-1})^3}{\Delta (n)^2} - \frac{a^2 (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1}/2)}{\Delta (n)^2}$$

$$= \frac{a^2 (b + k^{-1})^3 + a^2 (b + 2k^{-1})^2 (b + k^{-1}/2)}{\Delta (n) - b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2+3bk}\right)}$$

$$\times \left\{ D^2 - \left[ 1 - \frac{b^2 \left(1 + \frac{2}{2+3bk}\right)}{\Delta (n)} \right]^2 \right\},$$

where $D$ is defined in equation (30). Under Assumptions 2 or 3, the expression in curly brackets in equation (A.16) is positive. In addition, since $\Delta (n)$ declines with $n$, we know that $\Pi_M^a (n-1) - \Pi_s(n) - \Pi_f(n)$ increases with $n.
We can show the profit ratio \( \frac{\Pi_M^a (n - 1) - \Pi_s(n) - \Pi_l(n)}{\Pi_f(n)} \) is equal to a positive constant times the expression
\[
\left( 1 - \frac{b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3\kappa} \right)}{\Delta(n)} \right)^{-2} \left( D^2 - \left[ 1 - \frac{b^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2}{2+3\kappa} \right)}{\Delta(n)} \right] \right),
\]
which, under Assumptions 2 or 3, increases with \( n \).

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Using equation (31), we can derive
\[
OM_l(y, y^*_l; \xi_l; n) = [\xi_l^r V_M^n(y^*_l; n - 1) - V_l(y^*_l; n) - X_l^l] E^p \left[ e^{-r\tau y_l^*} \right],
\]
for some undetermined threshold \( y^*_l \geq y \). By Karatzas and Shreve (1999), we know that
\[
E^p \left[ e^{-r\tau y_l^*} \right] = \left( \frac{\beta}{y_l^*} \right)^\beta,
\]
where \( \beta \) is the positive root of the characteristic equation (33). Thus, we obtain equation (32). Solving the first-order condition (34), we obtain equation (35). Similarly, we can derive equation (38). We can then use equations (35) and (38) to determine the equilibrium sharing rule \( \xi^*_l \) in (40) by solving the equation \( y^*_l = y^*_s \) for \( \xi_l \). Substituting \( \xi^*_l \) into either (35) or (38) yields the option value-maximizing merger threshold reported in equation (39). Finally, the comparative statics results in parts (ii) and (iv) of the proposition follow from Lemma 1 and Propositions 2 and 4.

**Proof of Proposition 7:** Evaluating equations (44) and (46) at the merger threshold \( Y(t) = y^* \) and using the results from Propositions 4 and 6, we find the cumulative merger returns in equations (47) and (48). Finally, consider part (iii). By Lemma 1 and Assumptions 2 and 3, the cumulative merger returns to the small and large merging firms are positive and increase with \( n \). Since \( \Delta(n) > 0 \) and drops with \( n \) by equation (14), it follows from equation (48) that the cumulative returns to rival firms are also positive and increase with \( n \).

**Proof of Proposition 8:** We first consider Case 1(a), where the large firm bidder wins the contest, and the small firm bidder is too weak to matter. In this case, the equilibrium is the same as that with a single large firm bidder. The equilibrium merger threshold \( y^*_l \) and ownership share \( \xi^*_l \) of the large firm bidder are given in Proposition 6. Using equation (52), we can derive the
breakeven share of the small firm bidder at the merger threshold \( y^* \):

\[
\xi_{s}^{BE} = \frac{X_s + V_s (y^*; n)}{V_i (y^*; n + 1)} = \frac{X_s + \Pi_s (n) (y^*)^2 / (r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2))}{\Pi_l (n + 1) (y^*)^2 / (r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2))} = \frac{(\beta - 2) X_s \left[ \Pi_M^l (n + 1) - \Pi_l (n) - \Pi_s (n) \right] + \beta (X_s + X_l) \Pi_l (n)}{\beta (X_s + X_l) \Pi_l (n + 1)}.
\] (A.20)

For condition (54) to hold, we must have

\[
(1 - \xi_{l}^*) \Pi_M^l > (1 - \xi_{s}^{BE}) \Pi_l (n + 1).
\] (A.21)

Substituting equation (A.20) for \( \xi_{s}^{BE} \) and equation (40) for \( \xi_{s}^* \) into equation (A.21) yields equation (61). We thus obtain part (i) of the proposition.

We next consider Case 1(b), where the large firm bidder wins the contest, and the small firm bidder matters. Using equations (52) and (56) as well as Propositions 2 and 4, we can derive the merger threshold selected by the winning large firm bidder as a function of \( \xi_{l}^{max} \):

\[
y = y_B (\xi_{l}^{max}) = \sqrt{\frac{X_s (r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2))}{\Pi_l (n + 1) - \Pi_s (n) - (1 - \xi_{l}^{max}) \Pi_M^a (n - 1)}}.
\] (A.22)

Using equation (38), we can derive the merger threshold selected by the small firm target’s given the winning bidder’s demanded ownership share \( \xi_{l}^{max} \):

\[
y = y_T (\xi_{l}^{max}) = \sqrt{\frac{\beta X_s (r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2))}{\beta - 2 (1 - \xi_{l}^{max}) \Pi_M^a (n - 1) - \Pi_s (n)}}.
\] (A.23)

In equilibrium, the winning bidder and the target must agree on the merger timing in that

\[ y_B (\xi_{l}^{max}) = y_T (\xi_{l}^{max}) = y_{cl}^* \]. We can then solve the system of equations (A.22) and (A.23) for the winning bidder’s ownership share \( \xi_{l}^{max} \) and the merger threshold \( y_{cl}^* \) when the losing small firm bidder is strong. They are given in (63) and (64).

For Case 1(b) to happen, condition (61) must be violated. We thus obtain the first inequality in (62). In addition, the large firm bidder must be willing to participate. That is, we require \( \xi_{l}^{max} > \xi_{l}^{BE} \), and use (53) to compute the breakeven share at the equilibrium trigger \( y_{cl}^* \):

\[
\xi_{l}^{BE} = \frac{X_l + V_l (y_{cl}^*; n)}{V_M^a (y_{cl}^*; n - 1)} = \frac{(\beta - 2) X_l \left[ \Pi_l (n + 1) - 2 \Pi_s (n) \right] + 2 (\beta - 1) X_s \Pi_l (n)}{2 (\beta - 1) X_s \Pi_M^a (n - 1)}.
\] (A.24)

where \( y_{cl}^* \) is given in equation (64). Substituting equation (A.24) and equation (63) for \( \xi_{l}^{max} \) into the condition \( \xi_{l}^{max} > \xi_{l}^{BE} \), we obtain the second inequality in (62). Evaluating equation (44) for \( f = s \) and for \( f = l \) at the merger threshold \( Y(t) = y_{cl}^* \) in equation (64), when the large firm bidder
receives the share $\bar{\xi}_l^{max}$ in equation (63), and using the results from Propositions 2 and 4, we find the cumulative merger returns in equations (65) and (66). We thus obtain part (ii).

In Cases 2(a) and 2(b) the large firm bidder loses the contest. In these cases, we must have $\bar{\xi}_l^{max} < \xi_l^{BE}$. We thus have the first inequality in condition (67). We first consider Case 2(a), where the losing large firm bidder is weak. In this case, the equilibrium is the same as that with a single small firm bidder. We can easily derive the equilibrium share as $\xi_s^* = 1/2$, and the equilibrium merger threshold $\bar{y}^*$ is given by equation (73).

We now verify condition (57) in equilibrium. We must derive the breakeven share $\xi_l^{BE}$ at the equilibrium merger threshold $\bar{y}^*$. Using (53), we have

$$\xi_l^{BE} = \frac{X_l + V_l (\bar{y}^*; n)}{V_a M (\bar{y}^*; n-1)} = \frac{2\beta X_s \Pi_l (n)}{2\beta X_s \Pi_l (n-1)},$$

(A.25)

where $\bar{y}^*$ is given by (73). We now substitute $\xi_s^* = 1/2$ and (A.25) for $\xi_l^{BE}$ into the condition (57). After simplifying, we obtain condition (72). Evaluating (44) for $f = s$ at the merger threshold $Y(t) = \bar{y}^*$ in (73) when the small firm bidder receives the share $\xi_s^* = 1/2$, and using the results from Proposition 2, we find the cumulative merger return in (74). We thus obtain part (iv).

Finally, in Case 2(b) the losing large firm bidder is strong, which happens when condition (72) is violated. We thus obtain the second inequality in (67). To derive the equilibrium in this case, we first use (59) to derive the small firm bidder’s merger threshold as a function of his bid $\xi_s^{max}$:

$$\bar{y}_B (\xi_s^{max}) = \sqrt{\frac{r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}{\Pi_l (n-1) - \Pi_s (n) - (1 - \xi_s^{max}) \Pi_l (n+1)}},$$

We next derive the merger threshold selected by the target shareholders as a function of the winning small firm’s bid $\xi_s^{max}$. By a similar argument as in Section 3.1, we can show that

$$\bar{y}_T (\xi_s^{max}) = \sqrt{\frac{r - 2 (\mu + \sigma^2/2)}{\beta - 2 (1 - \xi_s^{max}) \Pi_l (n+1) - \Pi_s (n)}}.$$

In equilibrium, the merger thresholds must be the same in that $\bar{y}_B (\xi_s^{max}) = \bar{y}_T (\xi_s^{max}) \equiv \bar{y}_s^*$. Solving this equation yields $\bar{\xi}_s^{max}$ and $\bar{y}_s^*$ given in (68) and (69). Evaluating equation (44) twice for $f = s$ at the merger threshold $Y(t) = \bar{y}_s^*$ in (69) when the small firm bidder receives the share $\bar{\xi}_s^{max}$ in equation (68), and using the results from Propositions 2 and 4, we find the cumulative merger returns in equations (70) and (71). We thus obtain part (iii) and complete the proof. \[\square\]
References


Table 1. Decomposition of total merger surplus. The expressions $V_M^a(y^*;n-1), V_l(y^*;n),$ and $V_s(y^*;n)$ represent values of the merged firm, the pre-merger large firm, and the pre-merger small firm evaluated at the merger threshold. The expression $\tilde{V}_M(y^*;n)$ represents the value of the merged firm evaluated at the merger threshold if it uses the the large firm’s capital stock to produce output. We decompose the merger surplus (net of merger costs) $S \equiv V_M^a(y^*;n-1) - V_s(y^*;n) - V_l(y^*;n) - X_s - X_l$ into two components. One component, defined as $S_1 = \tilde{V}_M(y^*;n) - V_s(y^*;n) - V_l(y^*;n) - X_s - X_l$, is attributed to market power only. The other component, defined as $S_2 = V_M^a(y^*;n-1) - \tilde{V}_M(y^*;n)$, is attributed to cost savings. Parameter values are $K = 1, k = 0.2, b = 0.5, r = 0.08, \mu = 0.01, \sigma = 0.20,$ and $X_l = X_s = 2.$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$V_M^a(y^*;n-1)$</th>
<th>$V_M(y^*;n)$</th>
<th>$V_s(y^*;n)$</th>
<th>$V_l(y^*;n)$</th>
<th>$S_1$</th>
<th>$S_2$</th>
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<tr>
<td>$n = 2$</td>
<td>183,482</td>
<td>130,376</td>
<td>61,395</td>
<td>122,053</td>
<td>-53,076</td>
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<td>$n = 3$</td>
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<td>52,187</td>
<td>103,747</td>
<td>-45,094</td>
<td>45,124</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>$n = 4$</td>
<td>135,527</td>
<td>96,333</td>
<td>45,345</td>
<td>90,147</td>
<td>-39,163</td>
<td>39,193</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
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Figure 1. Profit differentials in symmetric and asymmetric mergers.

This figure depicts the profit differentials $\Pi_l(n+1) - 2\Pi_s(n)$ and $\Pi^a_M(n-1) - \Pi_s(n) - \Pi_l(n)$ as functions of the price sensitivity parameter $b$ and the number of large firms $n$ when $a = 100$, $K = 1$, and $k = 0.2$. 
Figure 2. Cumulative merger returns.

This figure depicts the cumulative returns of a small merging firm (dotted line), a large merging firm (dashed line), and a rival firm (solid line) as a function of the price sensitivity of demand $b$ and the number of large firms $n$. Parameter values are $a = 100$, $b = 0.5$, $K = 1$, $k = 0.2$, $n = 2$, $r = 8\%$, $X_l = 2$, $X_s = 2$, $\mu = 1\%$, and $\sigma = 20\%$. 
Figure 3. Bidder competition and industry competition.

The figure presents the bid premium \((\xi_l^* - \xi_l^{\text{max}}) / (1 - \xi_l^*)\) as a function of the number of large firms \(n\) and the price sensitivity of demand \(b\). Parameter values are \(a = 100\), \(b = 0.4\), \(K = 1\), \(k = 0.2\), \(n = 4\), \(r = 8\%\), \(X_l = 20\), \(X_s = 1\), \(\mu = 1\%\), and \(\sigma = 20\%\).