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Laura J. Kray¹, Conson C. Locke², and Alex B. Van Zant¹

Abstract

The authors examined *feminine charm*, an impression management technique available to women that combines friendliness with flirtation. They asked whether feminine charm resolves the impression management dilemma facing women who simultaneously pursue task (i.e., economic) and social goals in negotiations. They compared women's social and economic consequences after using feminine charm versus a neutral interaction style. They hypothesized that feminine charm would create positive impressions of its users, thus partially mitigating the social penalties women negotiators often incur. They also expected that the degree to which females were perceived as flirtatious (signaling a concern for self), rather than merely friendly (signaling a concern for other), would predict better economic deals for females. Hypotheses were supported across a correlational study and three experiments. Feminine charm has costs and benefits spanning economic and social measures. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Keywords

feminine charm, gender, negotiations, ingratiation, impression management, communal interaction style

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The political pundit Bill Maher recently interviewed former secretary of state Madeleine Albright. He noted the recent string of women occupying this global leadership position and pointedly asked her whether she thought women had it easier when negotiating with foreign leaders (mostly men) because they can flirt in a way that male diplomats simply cannot without calling their sexuality into question. Albright laughed and then conceded that she did indeed use her feminine charm in bilateral negotiations with foreign heads of state. Apart from any facetiousness in the exchange, what does the mere fact that Maher posed this question to Albright say about the strategies women enact to prevail in strategic interactions? We believe it reflects a commonly held (though unexamined) assumption that feminine charm enhances women's negotiating effectiveness.

We define feminine charm as an impression management technique available to women that combines friendliness with flirtation. Consistent with ingratiation more generally (Gordon, 1996; Jones, 1964; Jones & Wortman, 1973), the aim of feminine charm is to make an interaction partner feel good to gain compliance toward broader interaction goals. Although no precise formula exists for enacting feminine charm, the Albright example illustrates its essence. In practice, feminine charm manifests as a specific type of communal

interaction style. Whereas a communal style is characterized mainly by warmth, friendliness, and affiliation (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; Ridgeway, 1982), feminine charm also includes a number of socially desirable characteristics associated with flirtation,¹ including playfulness, flattery, and sexiness. Because flirtation serves an instrumental function (Hall, 1993; Henningsen, Braz, & Davies, 2008; Trapnell, Meston, & Gorzalka, 1997), combining it with friendliness may flatter and, ultimately, disarm one's interaction partner.

The current research examines feminine charm within the context of negotiations. Negotiations are inherently mixed-motive (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965) because they involve both a concern for oneself (a competitive motive) and a concern for one's negotiating counterpart (a cooperative motive). Effective negotiators balance these motives to reach mutually beneficial trade-offs, to create and maintain positive relationships, and

¹University of California, Berkeley, USA

²London School of Economics, UK

Corresponding Author:

Laura J. Kray, Haas School of Business, University of California, 545 Student Services Building, #1900, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
Email: kray@haas.berkeley.edu

to secure favorable agreement terms. We expected friendliness to signal a concern for others and flirtatiousness to signal a concern for self. As such, the relative balance of these two dimensions of feminine charm should predict female negotiator's economic performance, with more favorable terms resulting from stronger impressions of flirtation than mere friendliness.

Our work was guided by three research questions.

Research Question 1: Is feminine charm distinguishable from masculine charm, as the Albright example suggests? If so, then social charm should have unique effects on negotiations for women versus men.

Research Question 2: What are the distinct effects of friendliness and flirtatiousness, two core aspects of feminine charm? By conveying warmth and friendliness, we expected feminine charm to mitigate the social costs often incurred when females negotiate.

Research Question 3: How does feminine charm affect cooperation and competition? By producing positive reactions in its targets, feminine charm was expected to produce positive impressions of its users. Economically, we expected feminine charm to facilitate the crafting of mutually beneficial agreements that create joint value for negotiators.

Below, we also consider whether feminine charm renders women's requests irresistible (thus increasing their economic payoff) versus signals a lack of competitiveness (thus undermining their payoff).

Women's Impression Management Dilemma

Why would women deploy feminine charm in strategic interactions? By now it is well documented that women, unlike men, often experience a "damned if they do, damned if they don't" *impression management dilemma* characterized as follows: Engaging in agentic behaviors required to enhance perceptions of competence (e.g., self-promotion in a hiring context) often produces social costs. However, failing to engage in agentic behaviors leaves women vulnerable to being perceived as less competent than their male peers (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Wood & Karten, 1986). The devaluing of women leaders who exhibit a masculine style (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992) is consistent with this "Catch-22," as the traits associated with effective leadership are typically masculine. The trade-off is produced by the mismatch between agentic behaviors required to project competence and the prescriptive elements of gender stereotypes (Deaux & Major, 1987; Heilman, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002).

In addition to task groups and leadership contexts, this dilemma plagues female negotiators. Like many performance tasks (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Lyness & Heilman, 2006),

negotiations are gender stereotyped in the sense that the traits associated with effective negotiators are stereotypically masculine (i.e., rational, assertive, high regard for one's own interests; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Williams & Best, 1982). As a result, women who engage in assertive negotiating behaviors are liked less and perceived to be more demanding than those who simply accept what they are offered without resistance; however, men appear to escape this negotiating penalty (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).

One reason for women to deploy feminine charm is to mitigate social penalties for engaging in the agentic behaviors required for effective negotiating. By being communal and conveying positive regard to their counterparts, women negotiators are expected to meet role-based expectations that women be nice (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). If flirtation signals a concern for the self and friendliness signals a concern for others, then combining them may provide a means for women to be agentic while simultaneously reaping social rewards.

We are also interested in the task and/or economic consequences of feminine charm. The literature on interaction style and influence seems to suggest feminine charm provides the key to resolving women's "double bind," thus allowing them to succeed on both social and task dimensions. Carli et al. (1995) assessed reactions to videotaped confederates' persuasive messages while varying their nonverbal style and showed that women confederates who adopted a social style were *more* rather than *less* influential than those who adopted a task-focused style because the former were perceived to be more likable. The researchers argued that women's displays of competence alone threatened men's higher status, and were insufficient to overcome women's lower status. By combining competence cues with sociability cues, the threat was eliminated, thus rendering women more influential. In related work, Carli (1990) found that women who spoke tentatively were more influential with male counterparts than women who spoke assertively. Furthermore, providing assurances about a female manager's communality can mitigate the negative social outcomes typically directed at women in leadership positions (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). The prescriptive advice to emerge from this research is for women to "blend" social (i.e., nonthreatening) and task cues, especially with male audiences. Indeed, this is consistent with the lay intuition that women can gain an advantage in negotiations by strategically using feminine charm.

Female Negotiators' Unique Challenges

To the extent that success in negotiations involves influencing the other party, women displaying feminine charm should claim a larger share of the negotiating pie. Accordingly, Babcock and Laschever's (2003) popular book about women's negotiation challenges concluded,

Recent research has identified ways for women to be influential and effective without making themselves less likeable and bringing social sanctions down on their heads. This research has shown that for women the key to safely and successfully exercising their influence is to be “nice.” (p. 104-105)

Although this conclusion may be warranted with respect to effecting attitude change in others, as Carli measured, it might not apply as straightforwardly in the negotiation arena. In none of the prior research were resources divided between interdependent parties, where one party’s gain was the other’s loss. In competitive interactions such as zero-sum negotiations, feminine charm may be an economic liability if its warmth signals a lack of competitiveness (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In Carli’s research, women’s warmth signaled cooperative intent, thereby reducing their interaction partner’s threat and increasing their receptivity to the persuasive message. Ridgeway (1978) also observed that low status members of groups (i.e., women) must prove their cooperative intent before they can exert reasonable influence. If feminine charm inadvertently signals low competitive intent, it may decrease rather than increase female negotiators’ economic payoffs.

We expected the friendly component of feminine charm to pose an economic liability to women. This prediction is consistent with research examining several correlates of friendliness and their effects on negotiations. First, personality variables related to friendliness have proven to be negotiation liabilities, including *unmitigated communion* (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008), *extraversion*, and *agreeableness* (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Second, emotional displays consistent with friendliness, such as happiness, reduce negotiator payoffs relative to emotional displays running counter to friendliness, such as anger (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Overall, the personality variables and emotional displays most closely associated with friendliness negatively impact negotiating effectiveness.

Summary

Overall, we expected feminine charm to produce positive impressions of female negotiators. However, whether feminine charm resolves women’s impression management dilemma by providing an effective means to obtain both social rewards and scarce economic resources is less straightforward. Because feminine charm combines friendliness with flirtatiousness, the relative strength of these two dimensions should influence impressions of female negotiators’ competitive intent. If feminine charm is perceived merely as friendliness, then female negotiators run the risk of appearing to lack competitive intent, resulting in economic liabilities. However, if the right balance is struck between friendliness and flirtatiousness, then female negotiators should avoid their impression management dilemma and derive economic benefits.

To test our hypotheses, we used a diverse set of methods and measures across a correlational study and three experiments. Study 1 examined whether women and men’s self-reported reliance on social charm predicted negotiation effectiveness. Experiment 2 manipulated the use of feminine charm (vs. a neutral interaction style) via a negotiation scenario and measured its impact on female negotiators’ social and task outcomes. Experiments 3 and 4 manipulated feminine charm via instructions provided to female negotiators in mixed-sex, face-to-face negotiating dyads. Whereas Experiment 3 involved a zero-sum negotiation, Experiment 4 used a mixed-motive negotiation involving both competitive and cooperative elements.

Study 1

The current study had two purposes. First, we sought to determine whether individual differences in reliance on feminine charm predict negotiating effectiveness. Second, we were interested in whether feminine charm (enacted by women) has different negotiation consequences from masculine charm (enacted by men).

Method

Participants. Participants were 100 students (64 male, 36 female) enrolled in an MBA negotiation course at a west coast business school. Of 122 enrollees, students were included in the sample if (a) they completed the prenegotiation survey and the negotiation exercise described below and (b) their negotiating counterpart completed a postnegotiation negotiating effectiveness assessment.

Procedure. During the 1st week of class, students completed an online survey assessing their bargaining style (for course purposes). Embedded in the survey were questions related to the current investigation. The survey indicated, “During negotiations, people often adopt particular verbal and nonverbal communication strategies to get their negotiating partner to say yes.” Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were likely to use personal charm. The response scale ranged from 1 (*extremely unlikely*) to 7 (*extremely likely*).

During this same week, participants also completed an in-class negotiation simulation² and then evaluated their negotiating partner’s effectiveness by indicating their agreement with the statement “Overall, my negotiating partner was effective” on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*).

Results and Discussion

First, we examined whether social charm and effectiveness ratings varied by negotiator sex. The degree to which males ($M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.39$) and females ($M = 5.06$, $SD = 1.22$) reported using social charm did not significantly differ, $F(1, 98) = 0.28$, *ns*. Likewise, effectiveness ratings of male

Table 1. Study 1: Regression Analysis of Negotiator Effectiveness Ratings

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Female	-0.01	-0.79*	-1.03**
Seller	-0.23**	-0.19*	0.44
Social charm	0.28***	0.14	0.21
Female × Social charm		0.80**	1.08**
Seller × Social charm			-0.60
Female × Seller			-0.12
R ²	.12	.16	.18

Note: Values represent standardized coefficient estimates.
* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

($M = 5.46$, $SD = 1.10$) and female ($M = 5.34$, $SD = 1.26$) negotiators by their counterparts did not significantly differ, $F(1, 96) = 0.22$, ns .

Next we examined whether social charm predicted effectiveness ratings and, if so, whether it did so differentially for males and females. First, we tested for main effects by conducting a regression analysis. We dummy coded negotiator sex and negotiator role. Female negotiators were assigned a value of 1 while male negotiators were assigned a value of 0; sellers were assigned a value of 1 while buyers were assigned a value of 0. We named these variables *female* and *seller* so that a value of 1 for these variables indicates that a given negotiator is either a female or played the seller role, respectively. We then regressed effectiveness ratings on negotiator sex, negotiator role, and negotiator social charm reliance. Notably, we found a main effect of social charm such that a self-reported reliance on social charm positively impacted effectiveness ratings, $\beta = .28$, $t(96) = 2.81$, $p < .01$. See Model 1 in Table 1 for other coefficients in this regression.

Given our interest in testing whether feminine charm produced different consequences than masculine charm, we included a Female × Social charm interaction in a secondary regression to test whether social charm impacts negotiator effectiveness differently for women than for men. When we added the two-way interaction term as a parameter to Model 1, we found a significant interaction between negotiator sex and social charm, $\beta = .80$, $t(95) = 2.00$, $p < .05$. This positive interaction suggests that, relative to male negotiators, female negotiators were considered to be more effective as they increased their reliance on social charm. See Model 2 in Table 1 for the other coefficients of this regression and Model 3 for a similar analysis.

To better illustrate this interaction, a correlation analysis was conducted. Consistent with the results of Model 1, self-reported reliance on social charm predicted effectiveness ratings by one's negotiating counterpart, $r(100) = .27$, $p < .01$. However, this relationship was only significant for female negotiators, $r(36) = .53$, $p < .01$; for male negotiators, the relationship was not statistically significant, $r(64) = .12$, $p = .34$. Consistent with Models 2 and 3 in Table 1, females

appear to have benefited from the use of social charm whereas males neither benefited nor were harmed by the use of social charm.

Females' self-reported reliance on their personal charm to get others to comply with them resulted in more favorable evaluations by others. This relationship suggests the females in this sample were successful in enacting the impression management strategy. Their negotiating counterparts enjoyed interacting with them and saw them as successful negotiators. The fact that this relationship between charm and impressions was only observed for female negotiators and not male negotiators suggests feminine charm is a gender-specific impression management technique. As such, we will focus on feminine charm for the remainder of the article.

Feminine charm predicted positive impressions of female negotiators, yet the correlational nature of the reported relationship is subject to alternative explanations. For example, it may be that women who had been relatively effective at gaining compliance in the past attributed their success to personal charm when in fact it was due to other spurious variables like confidence, experience, or physical attractiveness that also influenced their negotiating counterparts. To further flesh out the relationship between feminine charm and negotiating effectiveness, we turned to controlled experiments.

Experiment 2

The previous study provided correlational evidence to suggest that feminine charm influences negotiating effectiveness. The current experiment was designed to examine this relationship further in three ways. First, the previous study measured reliance on feminine charm from the perspective of a focal actor, but it did not assess feminine charm from the perspective of its target. In the current experiment, we manipulated feminine charm from the perspective of a focal actor and then measured impressions formed by targets of feminine charm.

Second, the previous study did not allow us to determine what it is exactly about feminine charm that influences negotiating effectiveness. We expected flirtatiousness and friendliness, two components of feminine charm, to impact perceptions of concern for self and other (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). We hypothesized that friendliness conveys a stronger concern for other than self, whereas flirtation conveys a stronger concern for self than other. Because flirtation conveys agency and friendliness conveys communion, we expected that relatively stronger impressions of flirtation would predict relatively favorable economic offers to female negotiators. To test our hypotheses, the current study used a scenario in which a female negotiated the purchase of a vehicle while either using feminine charm or a neutral interaction style. We measured impressions of the focal negotiator as well as her perceived motives.

Method

Participants and Design. We recruited 93 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online recruitment site where workers complete tasks electronically in exchange for payment. Of the recruited participants, 44 were male and 49 were female. In all, 47.3% of participants were aged 18 to 29 years, 18.3% were aged 30 to 39 years, 18.3% were aged 40 to 49 years, and 16.2% were 50 years or older. Participants were paid US\$0.50 for their responses. The experiment included two between-subject conditions (feminine charm, neutral style).

Procedure. Participants read a hypothetical scenario where they were asked to imagine that they were selling a car (worth US\$1,200) to a potential buyer named Sue. They were told that they were about to meet the buyer, who had indicated a desire to purchase the vehicle pending the results of a test drive.

Charm manipulation. We manipulated the presence or absence of feminine charm by varying the buyer's behavior in the scenario. Participants in the feminine charm condition read,

As you meet and shake hands, Sue smiles at you warmly and says, "What a pleasure to meet you." You chat about the weather as Sue takes off her coat and sits down. Looking you up and down, Sue leans forward, briefly touches your arm and says, "You're even more charming in person than over email." Then, somewhat playfully, she winks at you and says, "What's your best price?"

Participants in the neutral style condition read,

As you meet and shake hands, Sue smiles and says, "It's a pleasure to meet you." You chat about the weather as Sue takes off her coat and sits down. Looking you directly in the eye, Sue says, "I'm looking forward to talking over the financials with you and hopefully working out a deal today. Let's get down to business." Then, somewhat seriously, she says, "What's your best price?"

Dependent Measures. Participants indicated their best price (in U.S. dollars). Next, we measured impressions of the focal negotiator along four dimensions: (a) perceived friendliness ($\alpha = .74$): friendly, warm; (b) perceived flirtatiousness ($\alpha = .89$): flirtatious, sexual; (c) concern with self: self-interested; and (d) concern with other: concerned with your outcome. The response scales ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*).

Results

Effects of Feminine Charm

Best price. An ANOVA with feminine charm and participant sex as between-subject factors was conducted. Participants

offered the buyer a lower (i.e., better) price in the feminine charm condition ($M = \text{US}\$1,144.00$, $SD = 158.96$) than in the neutral style condition ($M = \text{US}\$1,231.35$, $SD = 319.49$), $F(1, 89) = 3.40$, $p = .07$, $\eta^2 = .03$. The use of feminine charm by female negotiators increased the attractiveness of the offers they received. This main effect was qualified by an interaction with participant sex, $F(1, 89) = 4.72$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .05$. We analyzed the simple effects and found that men offered the female buyer a better price in the feminine charm condition ($M = \text{US}\$1,077.08$, $SD = 180.56$) than in the neutral style condition ($M = \text{US}\$1,279.90$, $SD = 438.85$), $F(1, 42) = 4.28$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .09$. However, among female participants, there was no significant difference between offers in the feminine charm condition ($M = \text{US}\$1,205.77$, $SD = 106.14$) and the neutral style condition ($M = \text{US}\$1,189.13$, $SD = 156.64$), $F(1, 47) < 1$, $p = .66$.

Impressions of friendliness and flirtatiousness. Because we expected the effect of feminine charm to hinge on the relative strength of its underlying dimensions, we examined impressions of both friendliness and flirtatiousness. We conducted a mixed-model ANOVA, with type of impression as a within-subject factor and both feminine charm and participant sex as between-subject factors. Two main effects and an interaction emerged. First, male participants ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.20$) evaluated the focal negotiator more positively overall than did female participants ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.25$), $F(1, 89) = 6.76$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Second, participants perceived the focal negotiator to be more friendly ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.22$) than flirtatious ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 2.12$), $F(1, 89) = 38.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .30$. This main effect for type of impression was qualified by the predicted interaction with feminine charm, $F(1, 89) = 103.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .54$. In the feminine charm condition, participants perceived the focal negotiator to be more flirtatious ($M = 5.61$, $SD = 1.14$) than friendly ($M = 4.93$, $SD = 1.29$), $F(1, 48) = 10.20$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .18$; in the neutral style condition, the focal negotiator was perceived to be more friendly ($M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.13$) than flirtatious ($M = 2.20$, $SD = 1.38$), $F(1, 41) = 104.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .72$. No other significant effects emerged.

Next we sought to understand the relative impact of friendliness and flirtatiousness. We hypothesized that more friendliness than flirtatiousness would predict worse economic outcomes for female negotiators. To test this hypothesis, we computed a relative friendliness variable by subtracting flirtatiousness impressions from friendliness impressions. Higher values indicate greater relative friendliness compared with flirtatiousness. We found that greater relative friendliness predicted worse economic outcomes, as measured by the best offer given the female buyer by sellers, $r(93) = .25$, $p = .02$. Likewise, relative friendliness positively predicted concern with other, $r(93) = .41$, $p < .001$, and negatively predicted concern with self, $r(93) = -.41$, $p < .001$.

Perceived negotiator motives: Concern with self and other. We hypothesized that, by combining flirtatiousness with friendliness, feminine charm would increase the degree to which

Table 2. Experiment 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Variables

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Best offer	1,184.39	248.95	—					
2. Friendliness	4.97	1.22	.17	—				
3. Flirtatiousness	4.03	2.12	-.19*	.05	—			
4. Relative friendliness	0.94	2.39	.25**	.47****	-.86****	—		
5. Concern for self	5.00	1.57	-.15	-.04	.44****	-.41****	—	
6. Concern for other	3.18	1.77	.11	.27***	-.30***	.41****	-.38****	—

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

female negotiators were perceived to be concerned with their own outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA, with type of concern as a within-subject factor and both feminine charm and participant sex as between-subject factors. A main effect for type of concern emerged, $F(1, 89) = 44.62, p < .001, \eta^2 = .33$. Participants perceived the focal negotiator to be more concerned with herself ($M = 5.00, SD = 1.57$) than with them ($M = 3.18, SD = 1.77$). However, this main effect was qualified with an interaction with feminine charm, $F(1, 89) = 26.17, p < .001, \eta^2 = .23$. In the feminine charm condition, participants perceived the focal negotiator to have more concern with herself ($M = 5.68, SD = 1.27$) than with them ($M = 2.64, SD = 1.75$), $F(1, 48) = 471.91, p < .001, \eta^2 = .60$; in the neutral style condition, the difference between concern for self ($M = 4.21, SD = 1.52$) and other ($M = 3.81, SD = 1.59$) was not statistically significant, $F(1, 41) = 1.20, ns$. No other effects were significant.

Relationship Between Variables. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Several effects are noteworthy. Perceived flirtatiousness and perceived friendliness were uncorrelated. Although we have conceptualized them as two aspects of feminine charm, in the current study, these two impressions were formed entirely separately. Second, perceived flirtatiousness predicted a perception of both high concern for the self and low concern for the other. In contrast, friendliness simply promoted a perception of high concern for the other without predicting perceptions of a female negotiator's concern for herself.

Next we examined whether relative friendliness mediated the relationship between the feminine charm manipulation and both perceived negotiator motives and negotiation outcomes. First, we examined whether relative friendliness mediated the relationship between the feminine charm manipulation and concern with other. Above, we reported significant relationships between (a) feminine charm and concern with other and (b) relative friendliness and concern with other. To test for mediation, we regressed concern with other on both feminine charm condition and relative friendliness and found that the effect of feminine charm on concern for other was reduced to nonsignificance, $\beta = -.07, t(90) = -0.52, ns$, whereas relative friendliness exhibited a significant positive




Figure 1. The buyer's friendliness minus flirtatiousness difference score mediated the relationship between feminine charm and the buyer's concern with other rating

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

effect on concern with other, $\beta = .35, t(90) = 2.49, p = .02$. A Sobel test confirmed that relative friendliness completely mediated the effect of feminine charm on perceived concern with other, $Z = -2.42, p = .02$ (see Figure 1). A test for mediation on the concern for self variable did not find evidence that relative friendliness mediated the relationship between feminine charm and concern for self, $Z = 1.02, p = .31$.

In a second set of regressions, we examined whether relative friendliness mediated the relationship between feminine charm and best offers. We reported above significant relationships between feminine charm and best offers as well as relative friendliness and best offers. To test for mediation, we regressed best offers on both feminine charm and relative friendliness. We found that relative friendliness exerted a marginally significant positive effect on best offers, $\beta = .26, t(90) = 1.74, p = .08$, whereas the effect of feminine charm on best offers was not significant, $\beta = .02, t(90) = 0.11, ns$. A Sobel test revealed that relative friendliness mediated the relationship between feminine charm and the best offer variable to a marginally significant extent, $Z = -1.72, p = .09$ (see Figure 2).

Discussion

The current experiment provides further evidence that feminine charm shapes negotiating effectiveness. Using a scenario in which we manipulated the interaction style of a female negotiator, the current findings demonstrate that feminine charm can produce positive economic returns for




Figure 2. The buyer's friendliness minus flirtatiousness difference score mediated the relationship between feminine charm and the best offer of participants

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

female negotiators. To the degree that the behavior is perceived as flirtatious rather than mere friendliness, it signals a concern for the self that predicts better offers by one's negotiating counterpart.

Across interaction styles, the focal negotiator's behavior was perceived to be more friendly than flirtatious. Yet it was the perception of flirtatiousness that varied across conditions. Flirtatiousness was rated higher in the feminine charm condition than the neutral style condition; however, perceived friendliness did not differ across interaction styles. These two aspects of feminine charm sent different signals about the female negotiator's underlying motives. Specifically, flirtatiousness and friendliness were distinguished by the signal they sent about the focal negotiator's degree of concern for other. Whereas friendliness sent a positive signal about concern for other, flirtatiousness sent a negative signal about concern for other. Furthermore, flirtatiousness and friendliness were distinguished by their economic consequences. Whereas relative flirtatiousness predicted better economic terms, relative friendliness predicted worse economic terms. If feminine charm combines friendliness with flirtation, then how it affects the distribution of resources in a zero-sum negotiation should hinge on the balance between these two impressions.

Experiment 3

The previous experiment demonstrated two effects of feminine charm. First, it impacted the perceived motives of a focal female negotiator. Two aspects of feminine charm, friendliness and flirtatiousness, had differential effects on the degree to which a female negotiator was perceived to be concerned with herself and her negotiating counterpart. Whereas perceived friendliness implied a concern with other, perceived flirtatiousness implied a concern with self. Accordingly, relative friendliness as opposed to flirtatiousness predicted worse economic offers.

The previous experiment illustrated feminine charm's effects on impressions and best offers from a negotiating counterparty. Yet it did so within a static scenario that could not fully capture the complexity of face-to-face negotiations wherein both negotiators make offers and counteroffers. The

current experiment sought to generalize the effects of feminine charm to face-to-face negotiations. We sought to replicate the finding from Experiment 2, whereby relative friendliness predicted female negotiator's economic payouts.

In addition to examining the impressions formed of female negotiators using feminine charm, we also examined one possible mechanism through which these impressions are formed. We have argued that feminine charm is strategic behavior aimed at making an interaction partner feel good to gain compliance toward broader interaction goals. To this end, the current experiment also measured negotiator mood. We hypothesized that feminine charm, and particularly its flirtatiousness component, would enhance their negotiating partner's positive mood. We also explored whether negotiation partner mood predicted negotiation outcomes.

Method

Participants and Design. Participants were 34 undergraduates (17 female, 17 male) who were paid US\$15 each. Participants were paired into mixed-sex negotiating dyads, with the female always assigned to the role of seller and the male always assigned to the role of buyer. The female negotiator's interaction style was manipulated (feminine charm, neutral).

Procedure. Participants began by reviewing their role information for a negotiation concerning the sale of a biotechnology plant (see Kray et al., 2001). The sole issue was sale price.

Experimental manipulation. We manipulated feminine charm by adapting a methodology used by Maddux, Mullen, and Galinsky (2008) to examine the effect of strategic mimicry in negotiations. Specifically, attached to negotiators' private role instructions was an "urgent message" that provided guidelines for an interaction style to adopt. In the *feminine charm condition*, females were advised to be animated in their body movements, make frequent eye contact with their partner, smile, and laugh. They were further advised to be playful and to compliment their partner in as sincere a fashion as possible. Females in the *neutral style condition* were advised to focus on the information in their role materials, be prepared, and remain in their role. They were further advised to act natural and be themselves. Male participants were provided the neutral style instructions. All participants were told that the interaction style works best when it is subtle. To ensure that, regardless of interaction style condition, negotiators remained focused on economic outcomes, all negotiators were explicitly told that their primary goal was to get the best economic deal possible.

Dependent Measures

Feminine charm manipulation check. We adapted the manipulation check used by Maddux et al. (2008) wherein, immediately after the interaction, females provided a written description of their interaction style. Two coders rated the extent to which females' behavioral descriptions were

consistent with feminine charm (1 = *neutral*, 7 = *charm*). Because reliability was high ($\alpha = .96$), coders' ratings were averaged.

Negotiation performance. Sale price was the economic performance measure. Because females were always assigned to the role of seller, higher sale prices indicated better performance.

Impressions of female friendliness and flirtatiousness. After the negotiation, males assessed female friendliness ($\alpha = .85$): friendly, warm, and likable. Responses were on 9-point scales from 1 (*not at all*) to 9 (*extremely*). Males assessed female flirtatiousness ($\alpha = .80$): flirtatious, sexual, playful, and attractive. The response scale ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 9 (*extremely*).

Male negotiator mood. After evaluating the female negotiator, male negotiators also completed the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which measures both positive and negative mood.

Results

Feminine Charm Manipulation Check. Females in the feminine charm condition ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 1.34$) described their negotiating behavior as more consistent with feminine charm than females in the neutral style condition ($M = 2.17$, $SD = 1.48$), $F(1, 15) = 31.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .68$.

Effects of Feminine Charm

Negotiation performance. Female sellers who used feminine charm ($M = \text{US}\$19.77$, $SD = 1.27$) negotiated a significantly lower (i.e., worse) sale price than female sellers adopting a neutral style ($M = \text{US}\$23.52$, $SD = 4.58$), $F(1, 15) = 4.96$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .25$. Contrary to the previous experiment's finding, the use of feminine charm rendered worse economic deals for female negotiators.

Given the different instantiations of feminine charm across the two studies, the divergent effects of feminine charm may have resulted from differing impressions of friendliness relative to flirtatiousness. Because friendliness signals concern for other, we expected relative friendliness to predict worse economic performance for female negotiators. To examine this possibility, we turned to negotiator impressions.

Impressions of friendliness and flirtatiousness. To analyze perceived friendliness and flirtatiousness, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA, with type of impression as a within-subject factor and feminine charm as a between-subject factor. Male negotiators perceived female negotiators to be more friendly ($M = 6.88$, $SD = 1.31$) than flirtatious ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.28$), $F(1, 15) = 94.49$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .86$. Unlike the previous experiment, the interaction with feminine charm condition was not statistically significant.

As in the previous experiment, we computed a relative friendliness variable. Again, we found that greater relative friendliness predicted worse economic outcomes for female negotiators, $r(17) = -.48$, $p = .05$. So although the current

experiment showed a negative economic effect for feminine charm and the previous experiment showed a positive economic effect for feminine charm, in both experiments greater friendliness relative to flirtatiousness predicted worse economic outcomes for female negotiators.

Male negotiator mood. We hypothesized that feminine charm would elevate male negotiators' positive mood. Indeed, males rated their mood more positively after negotiating with a counterpart using feminine charm ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.07$) than a neutral style ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 0.85$), $F(1, 15) = 4.35$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = .23$. However, the difference in male negotiators' negative mood across the feminine charm ($M = 1.20$, $SD = 0.26$) versus neutral style conditions ($M = 1.27$, $SD = 0.37$) did not significantly differ, $F(1, 15) = 0.18$, *ns*.

Relationship Between Variables. Table 3 presents the intercorrelations between variables. Several effects are noteworthy. First, female negotiators' self-described use of feminine charm predicted friendliness impressions, and to a lesser degree flirtatiousness impressions, formed by male negotiators. Second, feminine charm also had strong effects on male negotiators' moods. Overall, female negotiators' use of feminine charm elicited significantly more positive moods and less negative moods among male negotiators. Whereas flirtatiousness itself predicted stronger positive moods for male negotiators, relative friendliness predicted weaker negative moods for male negotiators. However, with both aspects of feminine charm impacting different aspects of male mood, it is perhaps not surprising that male mood did not predict negotiation outcomes.

Discussion

Once again, feminine charm predicted both impressions formed of female negotiators and negotiation agreements. Unlike the previous experiment that demonstrated a positive economic return for female negotiators using feminine charm, the current experiment demonstrated a negative economic return for the use of feminine charm. By examining the relationship between impressions formed as a result of feminine charm, a consistent pattern emerged across the two experiments. Females' interaction partners interpreted their behavior as either flirtatious or simply friendly. The degree to which the behaviors were deemed to be more friendly (signaling a concern for other) than flirtatious (signaling a concern for self) predicted worse economic deals for females. In the current experiment involving face-to-face negotiations, overall impressions of flirtatiousness were weaker than in the scenario study. Yet, consistent with our theory and the findings of the previous experiment, the degree to which flirtatiousness was conveyed *over and above* friendliness predicted better economic deals for female negotiators.

The current experiment also examined the impact of feminine charm on male negotiators' moods. We have argued that feminine charm operates by making one's interaction

Table 3. Experiment 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Variables

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Feminine charm	3.97	2.40	—						
2. Negotiation outcome	21.76	3.86	-.42*	—					
3. Friendliness	3.35	1.28	.69***	-.31	—				
4. Flirtatiousness	2.21	1.19	.38	.24	.33	—			
5. Relative friendliness	3.53	1.50	.28	-.48**	.59**	-.57**	—		
6. Male positive mood	2.84	1.05	.49**	-.08	.43*	.71***	-.23	—	
7. Male negative mood	1.24	0.31	-.42*	.14	-.32	.30	-.54**	.15	—

Note: Feminine charm was self-described behavior; friendliness and flirtatiousness were other-rated.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

partner feel good. Here, we show that the flirtatiousness aspect of feminine charm elevated male negotiators' positive moods and the relative friendliness aspect of feminine charm reduced male negotiators' negative moods. Although flirtation is inherently flattering, it runs the risk of being seen as manipulative (Kray & Locke, 2008). Stronger impressions of friendliness, as opposed to flirtatiousness, may have conveyed an absence of an ulterior motive by females, thus reducing male negotiators' negative moods.

It is important to note that, while the emotional states elicited by feminine charm are valuable in and of themselves, they did not predict negotiation agreements in this zero-sum context. Past research has shown that positive affect promotes cooperative negotiation performance (Carnevale & Isen, 1986) and negative affect reduces cooperative negotiation performance (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). Yet mood may have more variable effects on competitive negotiation performance. To be sure, negative emotional displays may elicit concessions from counterparties (Van Kleef et al., 2004), but the current research did not measure emotional displays of either party. However, consistent with observed effects of feminine charm on male negotiator mood, we expect feminine charm to positively impact cooperative negotiation performance. The next experiment tests this hypothesis.

Experiment 4

The previous experiments examined the impact of feminine charm in zero-sum negotiations, where one party's gain was the other party's loss. For example, in a negotiation over a car sale, each dollar saved by the buyer is a dollar lost by the seller. The final experiment was designed to examine the impact of feminine charm in a more complex negotiation involving multiple issues that are valued differently by negotiators. This type of negotiation is said to have integrative potential because, by cooperatively sharing information and making trade-offs, negotiators can create value. In other words, negotiators gain on issues valued more by them than their counterparts in exchange for making concessions on items valued more by their counterparts than them. For example, two friends negotiating over where to have dinner

and which type of movie to watch may trade off the two issues, such that the "foodie" selects the restaurant and the "movie buff" selects the film. By getting their top pick on the most important element of the evening, negotiators mutually create value (i.e., expand the pie). Yet, even negotiations that involve cooperation also involve competition, as "value that is created must be claimed" (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). In other words, at the end of the day, negotiators must jointly decide how to divvy up resources created through their cooperative efforts.

In the current experiment, we examined whether feminine charm helps mixed-sex negotiators to create value in negotiations with integrative potential. Effective value creation requires negotiators to exchange information to identify mutually beneficial trade-offs (Thompson, 1990). Behaviors consistent with feminine charm, such as rapport building (Drolet & Morris, 2000; Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990) and socially coordinating (Maddux et al., 2008; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), predict value creation. Likewise, both displaying (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006) and experiencing positive emotions (Carnevale & Isen, 1986) predict value creation. As a result, we expected feminine charm would help negotiators to reach agreements with higher joint gain (as measured by the sum total of both negotiators' payoffs).

In addition to examining joint gain, we also examined how feminine charm impacts the purely competitive division of resources at the bargaining table. The previous experiment's manipulation of feminine charm created impressions relatively high in friendliness compared with flirtatiousness. Using the identical manipulation, we expected this relatively friendly form of feminine charm would signal a greater concern for their male counterparts than themselves that would undermine female's ability to compete. In the current experiment, we examined impressions of concern for other by asking negotiators to indicate to what degree their counterpart appeared to understand them. If relative friendliness signals a greater concern for other than self, then it should translate into better performance for the male negotiator relative to the female negotiator. As a result, the expected creation of additional value via feminine charm may simply enhance male negotiators' outcomes rather than the outcomes of females.

Method

Participants and Design. Participants were 60 undergraduates (30 male, 30 female) who received course credit. All dyads were mixed sex. Three dyads failed to reach agreement on the negotiation task within the allotted time and were thus excluded from analyses, leaving a total of 27 dyads. We manipulated women negotiators' interaction style in the identical manner described in Experiment 3: They were randomly provided either the *feminine charm* or the *neutral style* instructions. Men were always given the *neutral style* instructions.

Procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory for a negotiations study. They were given 15 min to prepare for the negotiation and 30 min to negotiate the *New Recruit* (Neale, 1997) exercise, which involved eight issues for an employment contract (i.e., salary, start date, etc.) To facilitate comparisons across issues, each issue was assigned points to indicate its value to participants. The exercise was structured such that the sum total of points earned within dyads, or joint gain, varied depending on the degree to which negotiators made mutually beneficial trade-offs. By identifying pairs of issues in which negotiators had different priorities, negotiators could gain points on issues that they valued more highly than their counterpart in exchange for making concessions on issues that their counterpart valued more highly than them. The maximum obtainable joint gain was 13,200 points. Negotiators were told that their task was to earn as many points as possible. We counterbalanced role assignments (candidate, recruiter) for male and female negotiators.

Dependent Measures. Performance measures included *joint gain* and *individual gain*. Whereas joint gain was the sum total of points with dyads, individual gain was a relative measure of competitive performance assessing how much of the joint points were allocated to each negotiator.

As in the previous experiment, female negotiators provided a written description of their behavior immediately after the interaction. We averaged two coders ratings of the degree to which females embodied feminine charm ($\alpha = .96$). Finally, as a proxy for perceived concern for other, after the negotiation each negotiator indicated the degree to which his or her negotiating counterpart understood him or her on a scale from 1 (*not much*) to 7 (*quite a lot*).

Results

Feminine Charm Manipulation Check. Once again, females in the feminine charm condition ($M = 5.50$, $SD = 1.52$) reported their behavior as significantly more consistent with feminine charm than females in the neutral style condition ($M = 1.85$, $SD = 0.92$), $F(1, 24) = 56.62$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .69$.




Figure 3. Experiment 4: Individual gain by gender and feminine charm condition.

Note: Error bars: ± 1.96 SE

Effects of Feminine Charm on Negotiation Performance

Integrative negotiation performance. We analyzed joint gain at the dyadic level by summing the two negotiators' points and then comparing the two feminine charm conditions. As hypothesized, joint gain was higher when females used feminine charm ($M = 11,000$, $SD = 1,637$) than when females adopted a neutral style ($M = 9,200$, $SD = 1,903$), $F(1, 25) = 6.98$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .22$.

Relative negotiation performance. Relative negotiator performance was analyzed by examining the number of points earned by male and female negotiators within dyads. We conducted a mixed-model ANOVA, including gender as a within-dyad factor and feminine charm condition as a between-dyad factor. As hypothesized, gender interacted with feminine charm to determine relative performance, $F(1, 24) = 5.38$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .18$ (see Figure 3). Males performed significantly better when females used feminine charm ($M = 6,260$, $SD = 2,632$) than when females' style was neutral ($M = 3,883$, $SD = 1,670$), $F(1, 24) = 9.25$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .28$. Female negotiator performance did not vary by whether they used feminine charm ($M = 4,540$, $SD = 1,971$) versus a neutral style ($M = 5,317$, $SD = 2,298$), $F(1, 24) = 1.23$, $p = .28$, $\eta^2 = .05$.

Negotiator Understanding of Other. We hypothesized that feminine charm would enhance the degree to which male negotiators perceived female negotiators to understand them. In support of this hypothesis, male negotiators rated female negotiators as having a greater understanding of them in the feminine charm condition ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 1.00$) than the neutral style condition ($M = 4.60$, $SD = 1.12$), $F(1, 25) = 10.74$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .30$. In comparison, the degree to which female negotiators perceived male negotiators' understanding

Table 4. Experiment 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Variables

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Feminine charm	3.98	2.22	—						
2. Fem understand	5.44	1.16	.62***	—					
3. Male understand	5.33	1.13	.21	.70***	—				
4. Relative fem understand	0.17	0.87	.39*	.36*	-.41**	—			
5. Male points	5,203.71	2,521.67	.36*	.44**	.01	.34	—		
6. Female points	4,885.19	2,116.73	-.08	-.39**	-.18	.04	-.68***	—	
7. Joint gain	10,088.89	1,897.64	.38*	.15	-.14	.45**	.57***	.21	—

Note: Feminine charm was self-described behavior; fem understand = male perception of female understanding of male; male understand = female perception of male understanding of female; relative fem understand = female understanding of male minus male understanding of female.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

of them did not significantly differ between the feminine charm ($M = 5.50$, $SD = 0.94$) and neutral style ($M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.33$) conditions, $F(1, 25) = 0.72$, *ns*.

Relationship Between Variables. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics. Several effects are noteworthy. First, female negotiators' self-described use of feminine charm predicted the degree to which males perceived females as understanding them. Feminine charm reliance also marginally predicted both more points for male negotiators and more joint points for dyads. Second, both negotiators' perceptions of the other's degree of understanding of them were correlated. In other words, greater understanding by the female of the male predicted greater understanding by the male of the female. Third, and most important for testing our hypotheses, was the observation that male negotiators' perception that females understood them predicted relative performance in favor of male negotiators. Finally, the extent to which males perceived greater understanding by females than females perceived understanding by males predicted joint gain. Consistent with Experiment 2's finding that friendliness signals a concern for other, the relative friendly form of feminine charm examined here left male negotiators with a sense that female negotiators understood them. This perception facilitated cooperation between females and males, and enhanced male negotiators' outcomes.

Discussion

The current experiment demonstrated an economic benefit to feminine charm in mixed-sex negotiations: It facilitates cooperation that helps to expand the pie of resources shared between negotiators. Consistent with work examining the effectiveness of social interaction styles in cooperative and noninterdependent tasks (Carli, 1990; Carli et al., 1995), the deployment of feminine charm facilitated the cooperative aspect of negotiations. In the mixed-motive context, feminine charm had tangible economic benefits by increasing the dyad's joint gain. This economic benefit of cooperation was

predicted by a relative sense within dyads that female negotiators understood, and were thus concerned with, male negotiators.

Female negotiators' work in creating value via the use of feminine charm did not translate into any additional value for them. Consistent with the previous experiment showing that feminine charm improved male negotiators' competitive outcomes, in the current experiment, the additional value created through cooperation solely improved male negotiators' outcomes. In other words, *her* feminine charm improved *his* economic outcomes. It is notable that, in this negotiation where the absolute number of points was variable-sum rather than zero-sum, this benefit did not come at her direct expense. Although she was not economically harmed in an absolute sense, she captured no additional value either and feminine charm harmed her in relative economic terms.

General Discussion

The current research examined feminine charm, an impression management technique available to women that combines friendliness with flirtation to achieve their broader interaction goals. For the first time, we established feminine charm as a construct influencing social and economic outcomes for females navigating competition. In so doing, we identified several positive and negative consequences to the use of feminine charm.

Across a correlational study and three experiments using a diverse set of methods, a pattern emerged whereby female negotiators were perceived as friendlier, a key gauge of social outcomes for women, when displaying feminine charm than when adopting a neutral style. Feminine charm also predicted both competitive and cooperative performance. Study 1 demonstrated two effects. First, individual differences in reliance on feminine charm predict perceptions of negotiating effectiveness in the MBA classroom. Second, this relationship between charm and impressions held true for women but not for men. In Experiment 2, we differentiated two components of feminine charm that send

different signals about females' motives and, ultimately, affect how they perform in competitive contexts. Flirtatiousness signals a concern with self that predicts better economic terms for female negotiators, and friendliness signals a concern with others that predicts worse economic terms. We also examined females' competitive performance in both zero-sum negotiations (Experiments 2 and 3), where one party's gain is another's loss, and in mixed-motive negotiations with integrative potential (Experiment 4). In zero-sum negotiations, feminine charm led to better outcomes for female negotiators when perceived as relatively flirtatious and worse outcomes for female negotiators when perceived as relatively friendly. In a negotiation with integrative potential, feminine charm predicted the expansion of the proverbial negotiating pie by facilitating mutually beneficial trade-offs between negotiators.

We began by asking whether feminine charm resolves women's impression management dilemma by enabling them to be both well liked and effective in obtaining scarce resources. Clearly, the studies reported here suggest the answer to this question is nuanced. On one hand, we observed feminine charm produced consistent benefits for female negotiators' impression management goals. The use of feminine charm resulted in female negotiators being perceived as more effective (Study 1), having greater understanding of their negotiating partner's interests (Experiment 4), and enhanced the positive mood of their interaction partner (Experiment 3). On the other hand, feminine charm had more complicated effects on female negotiators' economic outcomes, enhancing their individual outcomes in Experiment 2 but harming them in Experiment 3. Because feminine charm combines friendliness with flirtation, its effect appears to reside in how these two dimensions are balanced. When perceived as flirtatiousness, female negotiators received better offers (Experiment 2); when perceived as friendliness, female negotiators negotiated worse deals (Experiment 3). This pattern is consistent with the finding that warmth signals a lack of competitiveness (Fiske et al., 2002), making friendliness an economic liability in a competitive, zero-sum negotiation. This may also explain the outcome in the mixed-motive negotiation (Experiment 4), that is, feminine charm signaled the female negotiator's cooperative intent (i.e., concern for other), which enabled expansion of the pie but hindered her ability to competitively claim the added value.

We note that the paradigm adopted in Experiments 3 and 4, wherein female undergraduates were instructed to strategically use feminine charm with male undergraduates in a laboratory setting, may have provided too little incentive for females to flirt blatantly rather than merely be friendly. Indeed, in Experiment 3 male negotiators' ratings clearly indicated a greater perception of friendliness than flirtation across the board. In the naturalistic MBA classroom environment of Study 1, where reputations are built around negotiating effectiveness (Anderson & Shirako, 2008), the incentives may have been sufficient for feminine charm to manifest more clearly in a flirtatious manner. The clearest demonstration of the

potential economic upside to flirtation beyond friendliness was evidenced in Experiment 2. Using a scenario in which a female negotiator's flirtatiousness was perceived quite clearly, participants perceived a concern with self among the female negotiator and offered her a more competitive price. Future research that increases the incentives of females to flirt or selects a sample with natural flirtation ability would be desirable for replicating the findings of Experiment 2, whereby the flirtatious form of feminine charm increased female's competitive performance.

In studying feminine charm, we examined it as a potential solution to women's impression management dilemma (Rudman, 1998), whereby females struggle to balance agency with communion. Women and men face unique trade-offs between professional accomplishment and social rewards (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004), particularly in masculine domains (Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Lyness & Heilman, 2006). As the provocative Maher-Albright exchange from our introduction indicates, lay wisdom seems to suggest that connecting socially with their counterparts enhances female's negotiating effectiveness. In addition to its folk benefits, we also note that an absence of feminine charm may result in professional sanctions. For example, in the landmark Supreme Court case on sex discrimination, *Anne Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse Coopers*, the accounting firm was found guilty of wrongfully denying Anne Hopkins partnership due to sex discrimination. Evidence of sexism included an evaluation that Hopkins take a "course at charm school" to stop being so "macho" (Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991). Rightly or wrongly, a perceived lack of feminine charm led to negative impressions of the candidate.

Our research suggests that feminine charm does create positive impressions of the female negotiator—but that it has complicated effects on her economic outcomes. The Hopkins example is consistent with past research showing that women's efforts to increase *perceived* task competence may inadvertently diminish perceived warmth and likability (Bowles et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998). For the first time, we show that this relationship may be bidirectional in that behaviors that enhance perceived warmth may diminish *actual* task competence. Another important conclusion from the current research is that context matters. Although women's attempts to influence others are facilitated when they blend social and task cues (Carli et al., 1995), this observation may only hold true for tasks involving little interdependence and no direct competition. The effectiveness of feminine charm depends on the task at hand (i.e., purely competitive vs. mixed-motive). The current research exposes a financial risk associated with female friendliness: Although it may facilitate the expansion of the proverbial negotiating pie and create positive impressions of female negotiators, the resulting division of resources may be unfavorable if she is perceived as "too nice."

Why do friendly women pay an economic price? Because the warmth conveyed signals a lack of intent to pursue

self-interested or competitive goals (Fiske et al., 2002). Given that women are generally thought to be disadvantaged in the competitive negotiation domain (Kray et al., 2001), emphasizing warmth alone backfires by reiterating age-old stereotypes that women are not competitive. Rather than enabling females to claim more value, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that a relatively friendly form of feminine charm undercut females' competitive performance in zero-sum negotiations. However, because females are expected to be nice and cooperative (Deaux & Major, 1987; Heilman, 2001), feminine charm allowed females to meet this expectation in a face-to-face competitive context, as evidenced by higher friendliness ratings in the feminine charm condition than the neutral style condition in Experiment 3. Feminine charm may mitigate some of the social costs females typically incur for negotiating (Bowles et al., 2007).

This research adds to a growing body of literature examining how men and women cooperate and compete with one another. Rather than being the product of innate qualities, gender differences can stem from gender stereotypes (Kray & Thompson, 2005). Although an implicit association exists between stereotypically masculine traits and negotiating effectiveness (Kray et al., 2001), highlighting the value of stereotypically feminine traits (i.e., verbal communication, listening skills) can increase women's confidence and thereby improve their economic performance (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002). In combination with recent research demonstrating that expressions of anger enhance men's status but diminish the status of women (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008), a picture is emerging to suggest the effectiveness of strategies for navigating competition and cooperation may be gender specific. Along these lines, feminine charm appears to be a uniquely feminine technique for managing negotiator impressions, increasing the proverbial negotiating pie, and, depending on its balance of friendliness and flirtatiousness, determining how resources are divided between the sexes.

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Notes

1. Flirtation is defined as "to behave amorously without serious intent; to show superficial or casual interest or liking"

(Merriam-Webster, 2011). Flirtation abounds in both platonic and romantic relationships (Egland, Spitzberg, & Zormeier, 1996) and provides both sexual and nonsexual value to interactions (Henningsen, 2004). We conceptualize feminine charm as largely involving platonic flirtation. Compared to mere friendliness, platonic flirtation involves a heightened sense of playfulness, enthusiasm, and attentiveness (Abrahams, 1994; Greer & Buss, 1994).

2. Because the unit of analysis for the negotiation exercise was the dyad (i.e., sale price) and the unit of analysis for feminine charm was the individual, we could not examine their relationship in this study without counting the dyad measure twice or removing half of the feminine charm data.

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